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Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, 
Disaster, and the Future of the American City 
Lisa Grow Sun 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake rocked Japan 
and triggered a massive tsunami that devastated the country’s 
northern coast.1 While the cautionary tales of this heart-breaking 
disaster will be written over many years or even decades, some critical 
lessons can already be discerned. Japan’s experience confirms, for 
example, that strict, well-enforced building codes are crucial tools for 
mitigating disaster risk.2 There is little doubt that an earthquake of 
this magnitude would have killed many more people had it occurred 
in almost any other densely populated urban area. Japan’s famously 
strict building codes saved many, many lives—likely reducing the 
death toll by tens of thousands.3 
The relative success of Japan’s building codes, however, should 
not obscure an equally important lesson: we cannot “build away” all 
disaster risk. No matter how stringent, no matter how well enforced, 
no matter how costly, building codes cannot eliminate disaster risk.4 
                                                
 .  Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. The author thanks Professors Dan Farber, Robert Verchick, Robin Kundis Craig, 
Lesley McAllister, Gregg Macey, Blake Hudson, Brigham Daniels, Alex Camacho, Amy 
Wildermuth, Lincoln Davies, and RonNell Andersen Jones for their excellent feedback on the 
ideas explored in this Article. She also appreciates the research assistance of BYU students 
Stephanie Barclay, Dustin Glazier, and Brandon Seal. 
 1. See Norimitsu Onishi, Reeling From Crises, Japan Approaches Familiar Crossroads, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/ 
20/world/asia/20future.html?_r=1&. 
 2. James Glanz & Norimitsu Onishi, Japan’s Strict Building Codes Saved Lives, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
03/12/world/asia/12codes.html?. 
 3. See Marlowe Hood, Tokyo at Risk: Can Megacities Cope with Disaster?, AFP.COM 
(Mar. 20, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/85qxbyd (quoting the assessment of Helena Molin 
Valdes, deputy head of the U.N. International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, that if the 
March 11, 2011 Japanese earthquake “had happened in a megacity with less preparedness 
capacity, the toll would have been in the millions, at least the hundreds of thousands”). 
 4. Perhaps different building standards could also have provided fuller protection 
against the ravages of the tsunami. Some experts suggest that more tsunami-resistant buildings 
can be designed. See Renata D’Alieso, Engineers’ Goal is Tsunami-Resistant Buildings, THE 
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Even when life can be preserved, the cost of property and other 
economic damages can be staggering. Moreover, structural solutions 
to disaster risk—such as strengthening building codes or building 
seawalls and levees—can sometimes deceive communities into 
increasing their exposure to hazards by lending a false sense of 
security through the air of invincibility that surrounds much modern 
engineering and construction.5 These measures can mask a basic 
truth: a community’s location is likely to be the single most 
important factor in determining a community’s vulnerability to 
natural disasters.6 Poorly designed cities in relatively “safe” locations 
may well fare better than the most carefully designed cities in 
particularly hazard-prone regions.7  
The fact that location is such a crucial determinant of disaster 
vulnerability might suggest, at first glance, that we have the capacity 
to mitigate disaster risk only at the margins, because settlement 
patterns were established, and major cities sited, long ago.8 
However, the deterioration of existing infrastructure, together with 
the infrastructure demands of a growing population, suggest that the 
largest potential gains in disaster mitigation can yet be achieved by 
making wise decisions about the location of new infrastructure. 9 In 
the United States, a large percentage—likely well more than half—of  
 
 
                                                                                                           
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
news/world/asia-pacific/engineers-goal-is-tsunami-resistant-buildings/article1940635/. Even 
if they are correct, however, significant residual risk is likely to remain. Id. 
 5. Structural flood protection measures “include dams, levees, floodwalls, 
channelization, and other engineered techniques.” ASS’N OF STATE FLOOD PLAIN MANAGERS, 
FLOODPLAIN MGMT. 2050, REPORT OF THE SECOND ASSEMBLY OF THE GILBERT F. WHITE 
NAT’L FLOOD POL’Y FORUM 19 (2007) [hereinafter FLOODPLAIN MGMT]. Levees have a 
well-documented Field of Dreams effect—“if you build them, they will come”; that is, levees 
spawn additional building in their shadow. See John Ritter, Several Cities are Dependent on 
Vulnerable Levees, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2005, at A6, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-11-vulnerable-levees_x.htm (describing 
how aging agricultural levees have come to protect large populations).  
 6. See U.N., 2009 GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT ON DISASTER RISK REDUCTION: 
RISK AND POVERTY IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 19 (2009) (concluding that disaster risk is 
“geographically highly concentrated”).  
 7. Cf. DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL 
HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 155–56 (1996) (‘‘No single approach to bringing 
sustainable hazards mitigation into existence shows more promise at this time than increased 
use of sound and equitable land-use management.’’). 
 8. See Ritter, supra note 5. 
 9. Id. 
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the infrastructure that we will need in 2050 to accommodate our 
growing population does not exist today.10  
Thus, the most far-reaching and important question for disaster 
mitigation today is where we will channel the growth that will be 
needed to accommodate our expanding population. Increasingly, 
environmentalists are promoting sustainability agendas—such as 
Smart Growth—that have a ready-made answer to this question: 
channel growth into existing cities.11 This preference for increasing 
the density of existing urban centers is understandable, as the costs 
of sprawl are substantial.12 However, this prescription and the various 
legal tools being used to implement it throughout the country often 
fail to grapple both with the serious disaster exposure facing many of 
our great American cities and with the concomitant potential that 
channeling future growth back into these cities may significantly 
exacerbate the disaster risk faced by future generations. While Smart 
Growth has great potential for making our communities more 
livable, more cost effective, and more environmentally sound, “Smart 
Growth in dumb places”—those that are particularly disaster 
prone—is the antithesis of true sustainability. This Article explores 
this critical tension between disaster mitigation and current 
sustainability policies.13 
Although environmental protection and disaster mitigation are 
often fellow travelers, these sustainability initiatives may put 
significant environmental policies on a collision course with the goal 
                                                
 10. See, e.g., Arthur C. Nelson & Robert E. Lang, The Next 100 Million, PLAN., Jan. 
2007, at 4 (arguing that the United States may reach 400 million by 2037, which will require 
the nation “to add about 40 million new housing units to its current inventory of 125 million 
and replace another 30 million homes that are likely to be damaged or torn down in the next 
three decades”). 
 11. See infra notes 29–41 and accompanying text; supra notes 5–6 and accompanying 
text. 
 12. See sources cited infra note 24. 
 13. Studies in other disciplines have documented that Smart Growth is occurring in 
some hazardous locations. See, e.g., Yan Song et al., Smart Development in Dangerous 
Locations: A Reality Check of Existing New Urban Developments, 27 INT’L J. OF MASS 
EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 1, 1 (2009) (finding “that New Urbanist developments are 
vulnerable to floods throughout the U.S. and a substantial number (36%) of New Urbanist 
developments are exposed to flood[] . . . hazards”). They have also found that Smart Growth 
developments are “significantly” more likely than traditional developments to rely on structural 
solutions (such as stream channel modification) to mitigate flood risk. See id. at 17. While 
these studies have made important contributions to our understanding of the relationship 
between Smart Growth and hazards, they have not focused on the ways in which Smart 
Growth’s emphasis on urban renewal is actually driving this risky development. 
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of mitigating natural disaster risk. This result is particularly ironic 
given that much of the recent support for these initiatives has been 
motivated and framed by concerns about climate change.14 Yet, our 
current sustainability policies may inadvertently be driving patterns 
of growth that will amplify, rather than mitigate, disaster risk, 
particularly in the face of the more frequent and ferocious hazard 
events climate change may spawn. This reality means that some of 
our current sustainability policies promoting urban living as a key 
method for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions may, in fact, be 
hindering efforts to adapt to the effects of climate change. This 
collision between climate change mitigation efforts and adaptation 
efforts is particularly problematic given the near consensus among 
scientists that some climate change is inevitable—and, indeed, is 
already under way—and that adaptation efforts will have to play a 
critical role in minimizing the effects of climate change on human 
populations.15  
Moreover, redevelopment efforts designed to direct growth back 
into hazardous urban areas—particularly those along coasts or inland 
waterways—that have fallen into disuse run counter to the 
widespread recognition among disaster scholars and practitioners 
that retreating from hazardous areas is perhaps the most cost-
effective, long-term disaster mitigation strategy.16 Many European 
nations, such as the Netherlands, that have long battled the seas and 
rivers and have relied largely on structural solutions (such as dikes) to 
mitigate disaster risk are now recognizing the need to “make room  
 
                                                
 14. See, e.g., Tania Katzschner & Gregg Oelofse, Climate Change: A Tipping Point For a 
Move Towards Sustainable Development?, in GREEN CITYNOMICS: THE URBAN WAR AGAINST 
CLIMATE CHANGE 16, 17 (Kenny Tang ed., 2009) (arguing that “climate change may 
represent a leverage point to move towards sustainability”). 
 15. See BRIAN FISHER ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 225 (2008). 
 16. See, e.g., FLOODPLAIN MGMT., supra note 5, at 24 (“We need to begin a pattern of 
gradual and voluntary relocation or strategic retreat from the highest-risk and most ecologically 
sensitive areas, with climate change and long-term sustainability both in mind.”); ANNA 
PUSZKIN-CHEVLIN ET AL., LIVING ON THE EDGE: COASTAL STORM VULNERABILITY OF THE 
TREASURE COAST BARRIER ISLANDS 83 (2007), available at docs.cdsi.fau.edu/cues/ 
LivingontheEdgeFinalacp-printversion.pdf (concluding that “strategic retreat” is “the most 
sustainable coastal hazard mitigation approach in the long term,” and thus that “[t]he sooner 
public policy can move away from hazard mitigation aimed at loss reduction through 
hardening and insurance risk-sharing to creating a resiliency through appropriate development 
that prevents loss damage, the faster our communities will reach a more optimal balance 
between cost-positive asset exposure and total storm damage costs”). 
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for the rivers” and to return some floodplain areas to their natural 
use.17  
Unfortunately, retreat from hazardous areas is notoriously 
difficult to implement given pre-existing property rights, the costs 
associated with voluntary buy-outs, the likely disruption of existing 
community ties that relocation entails, and local political opposition 
to relocation efforts.18 Even in the aftermath of devastating disasters, 
retreat from hazardous areas rarely occurs.19 
Nonetheless, some “underutilized” urban areas near coasts, other 
waterfronts, or other natural hazards may present real opportunities 
for strategic retreat. Once redevelopment occurs, however, huge 
public investments in redeveloped areas (financed by borrowing 
against anticipated future tax revenues from the redevelopment),20 
increased property prices, and reinvigorated communities will 
intensify calls for structural protections and make retreat far more 
difficult, even if sea level rise or other conditions ultimately make 
retreat the most viable option.  
Part II of this Article examines how current environmental 
initiatives, particularly sustainability initiatives such as Smart Growth, 
promote increasing population density and redevelopment of 
existing cities. Part III considers the ways in which channeling 
growth into some existing cities may exacerbate disaster risk. Part IV 
examines some of the legal tools used to channel growth into 
existing urban areas and concludes that these tools often fail to take 
adequate account of disaster risk. Finally, Part V considers possible 
first steps for making these sustainability initiatives more consonant 
with disaster mitigation.  
                                                
 17. See FLOODPLAIN MGMT., supra note 5, at 24. 
 18. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER TURBOTT & ANDREW STEWART, MANAGED RETREAT FROM 
COASTAL HAZARDS: OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 2–3 (2006) (recounting some of the 
obstacles facing attempts at managed or strategic retreat from hazardous coastal areas). 
 19. See id. at 16–18. 
 20. One of the most popular methods for financing redevelopment efforts is tax 
increment financing. See George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: 
The Uses and Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427, 436–37 (2011) 
(explaining that many redevelopment projects are funded through tax increment financing and 
that every state but Arizona authorizes such financing). Tax increment financing is built on the 
premise that redevelopment will increase the city’s future property tax revenues. See id. at 437. 
To finance current public works needed to support the redevelopment, “[e]ither the public 
agency rebates the developer a share of TIF revenues as they are collected, and the developer 
borrows against this future cash flow, or the public agency floats bonds secured by the 
anticipated tax increment.” Id.  
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II. ENVIRONMENTALISM AND URBANISM: AN EVOLUTION 
Environmentalism and urbanism have a long and checkered 
history. For decades, if not centuries, cities have been the bane of 
environmentalists.21 Cities epitomized all the evils of growth: the 
profligate consumption of natural resources, the obliteration of 
natural topography and land features, the destruction of green space, 
the pollution of air and watersheds, and the overwhelming of the 
natural carrying capacity of the environment.22 To the environmental 
mind, cities were dirty, polluted, and oppressive consumers of 
Mother Earth.23  
Today, in contrast, many mainstream environmentalists and 
environmental law scholars are engaged in a full-blown love affair 
with cities.24 Suburban sprawl, rather than urbanization, has become 
public enemy number one.25 Sustainability initiatives such as New 
Urbanism and Smart Growth extol the virtues of urban life and seek 
to replicate urban neighborhoods—with their mixed-use zoning and 
pedestrian-friendly streets—in areas outside the historic urban core.26 
Beyond patterning suburban neighborhoods on their denser 
urban cousins, most conceptions of sustainability, including those 
adopted and popularized by various federal agencies and state and 
                                                
 21. DAVID OWEN, GREEN METROPOLIS: WHY LIVING SMALLER, LIVING CLOSER, AND 
DRIVING LESS ARE THE KEYS TO SUSTAINABILITY 18 (2009) (“The hostility of many 
environmentalists toward densely populated cities is a manifestation of a much broader 
phenomenon, a deep antipathy toward urban life which has been close to the heart of 
American environmentalism since the beginning.”). 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See, e.g., Robert Cervero, Growing Smart by Linking Transportation and Urban 
Development, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 357, 358 (2000) (“Sprawl stands as a serious threat to a 
sustainable future.”); Jeffrey R. Kenworthy, The Eco-city: Ten Key Transport and Planning 
Dimensions for a Sustainable City Development, 18 ENV’T & URB. 67, 70 (2006) (“Higher 
densities can bring greater protection of the natural environment and food-growing areas in 
and around cities.”); Peter Newman, The Environmental Impact of Cities, 18 ENV’T & URB. 
275, 285 (2006) (“In terms of global sustainability, it is clear that [cities] should be stopping 
[their] sprawl and building up [their] density.”); see also Stop Sprawl: Sprawl Overview, SIERRA 
CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/overview/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (advocating 
“smart-growth solutions” to the many harms of urban sprawl).  
 25. See sources cited supra note 24. 
 26. See New Suburb?: Sprawl vs. “Smart Growth”, NATIONALGEOGRAPHIC.COM, 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/features/00/earthpulse/sprawl/gallery1.html (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2011) (contrasting New Urban development with traditional sprawl 
development); What is Smart Growth?, SMARTGROWTHAMERICA.ORG, 
http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/what-is-smart-growth (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) 
(advocating Smart Growth mixed-use communities for urban, suburban, and rural areas). 
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local policymakers, incorporate a strong, explicit preference for 
channeling future growth into existing urban areas.27 These 
initiatives thus encourage and promote revitalization and infill of 
existing urban areas, as well as other measures that would increase 
the density of existing cities.28 
The Obama administration, for example, kicked off one of its 
primary sustainability initiatives in July 2009, with the establishment 
of the federal joint Partnership for Sustainable Communities between 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the 
Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).29 One of the Partnership’s six “guiding 
livability principles” is to “support existing communities.”30 The 
Partnership aims to implement this principle by “target[ing] federal 
funding toward existing communities—through strategies like 
transit-oriented, mixed-use development, and land recycling—to 
increase community revitalization and the efficiency of public works 
investments and safeguard rural landscapes.”31 These implementation 
priorities emphasize using federal money to redevelop (“recycle”) 
land in existing cities and to increase density in those areas to 
support mixed-use neighborhoods and public transit. 32  
Similarly, one of the Smart Growth principles embraced and 
promoted by the EPA calls for “[s]trengthen[ing] and direct[ing] 
development towards existing communities.”33 President Obama’s 
2009 Executive Order on sustainability likewise emphasizes the need 
to channel new federal construction into “existing central cities.”34 
 
                                                
 27. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 29. Partnership For Sustainable Communities: EPA-HUD-DOT, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/SCP-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 
2011). The other five factors are to “provide more transportation choices,” “promote 
equitable, affordable housing,” “enhance economic competitiveness,” “coordinate and 
leverage federal policies and investment,” and “value communities and neighborhoods.” Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. ABOUT SMART GROWTH, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/ 
about_sg.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2011). 
 34. See Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. § 251 (2010) (charging federal agencies to 
“advance regional and local integrated planning” by “ensuring that planning for new Federal 
facilities or new leases includes consideration of sites that are pedestrian friendly, near existing 
employment centers, and accessible to public transit, and emphasizes existing central cities”). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2164 
Countless states and localities have adopted similar sustainability 
plans for increasing density in existing cities. New York, for example, 
recently passed the State Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy 
Act35 to halt public funding of sprawl by requiring state agencies to 
submit a “smart growth impact statement”36 for public projects and 
to “advance projects” that meet the state’s Smart Growth criteria. 
These criteria include “projects located in municipal centers,” 
“projects for the use, maintenance or improvement of existing 
infrastructure,” and “projects in developed areas or areas designated 
for concentrated infill development in a municipally approved 
comprehensive land-use plan, local waterfront revitalization plan, or 
brownfield opportunity area plan.”37 In Portland, the city’s Bureau 
of Planning and Sustainability has adopted “Neighborhood Design 
Policies” that encourage “new development” in areas that are losing 
housing and “increases in residential density” through “residential 
infill development.”38  
Scholars, planners, and commentators have likewise argued that 
increasing the density of existing cities is the best way to achieve 
sustainability aims like decreasing carbon footprint and minimizing  
 
 
 
                                                
 35. See State Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. 
LAW § 6-0101 (McKinney 2005). 
 36. Id. § 6-0107.3. 
 37. Id. § 6-0107.2; see also New York Governor Signs Measure Specifying Criteria for 
Smart Growth, BNA.COM (Sept. 1, 2010), http://climate.bna.com/climate/ 
summary_news.aspx?ID=142539 (subscription required). 
 38. CITY OF PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLANNING AND SUSTAINABILITY, 
NEIGHBORHOOD DESIGN POLICIES (2008), available at http://www.portlandonline.com/ 
bps/index.cfm?c=49249&a=223708 (account required); see also Jim Redden, Housing, Cars 
Don’t Mix, PORTLAND TRIB., Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/ 
story.php?story_id=117701496867496300 (“City, regional and state land-use policies call for 
new development to be concentrated in existing urban centers and along major transportation 
corridors.”). Examples of other areas where smart growth policies are encouraging infill 
include several cities in Florida, see Florida Sustainable Communities Demonstration Project, 
SMART COMMUNITIES NETWORK (Aug. 1998), http://www.smartcommunities.ncat.org/ 
success/florida_sust_project.shtml (highlighting Florida cities in which sustainability polices 
are encouraging urban redevelopment), and Chicago, see Infill and Redevelopment Regional 
Snapshot, CMAP.ILLINOIS.GOV, http://tinyurl.com/88angye (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) 
(outlining how Chicago is pursuing “urban infill development [as] a planning strategy that 
redirects growth from the urban and suburban fringes, or greenfields, into more dense urban 
cores to create compact, livable, and sustainable communities”). 
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other environmental ills.39 Sprawl has become the antithesis of 
sustainability40 and urbanization its platonic form.41 
Smart Growth initiatives appear to be having a real, 
demonstrable effect in shifting housing construction toward urban 
infill and redevelopment and away from outlying areas. A 2010 
report by the EPA found that regions known for their Smart Growth 
management techniques, including Portland, Denver, Sacramento, 
and Atlanta, are among those cities where the “shift inward” toward 
redevelopment of urban centers “has been most dramatic.”42 In eight 
regions—Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, Norfolk/Virginia 
Beach, Portland, San Diego, and San Francisco—urban 
redevelopment accounted for between twenty-five percent and fifty 
percent of new residential construction.43 A recent ranking of the 
country’s most sustainable cities included six of these regions in its 
top fifteen.44 
III. URBAN DISASTER VULNERABILITY 
These sustainability initiatives may well be on a collision course 
with efforts to mitigate disaster risk because increasing the density of 
existing cities presents several serious challenges for managing that 
risk. First, density itself, regardless of location, can heighten some 
kinds of disaster risk.45 Second, increasing density in risky locations is 
                                                
 39. See, e.g., PETER CALTHORPE, URBANISM IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 17 
(2011) (“Cities and urban places produce the smallest carbon footprint on a per capita basis.”); 
see also sources cited supra note 24. 
 40. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FREILICH ET AL., FROM SPRAWL TO SUSTAINABILITY: SMART 
GROWTH, NEW URBANISM, GREEN DEVELOPMENT AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 29–36 (2d. ed. 
2010) (cataloguing the costs of sprawl and contrasting sprawl to sustainable growth). 
 41. See, e.g., CALTHORPE, supra note 39, at 17 (“[T]ruly great urban places also happen 
to be the most environmentally benign form of human settlement and are at the heart of a 
green future.”).  
 42. See EPA, RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION TRENDS IN AMERICA’S METROPOLITAN 
REGIONS 2010, at 6, available at http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/metro_res_ 
const_trends_10.pdf. 
 43. See id. at 14. In eighteen other regions, urban redevelopment’s share of the housing 
market “increased significantly.” Id. 
 44. See Large Cities, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, http://smartercities.nrdc.org/ 
maps/large (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (including Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Portland, 
San Diego, and San Francisco in the top 15 sustainable cities).  
 45. Some commentators have previously identified urbanization as a factor in disaster 
risk. See MILETI, supra note 7, at 120; CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: 
REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 
30 (2007). However, the relationship between urbanization and disaster risk is likely more 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2166 
almost certain to exacerbate disaster risk—and many of our existing 
cities are located in risky locations, such as in low-lying coastal areas, 
along major earthquake faults, and along major rivers. Moreover, in 
many of these cities, much of the land available for redevelopment 
and infill—often land along waterfronts—is particularly hazard-
prone.  
The relationship between population density and disaster risk is 
complex. Sometimes density can mitigate disaster risk, including 
disaster mortality. For example, large multistory buildings can 
provide refuge to victims of tsunamis and other flood events.46  
On the other hand, density can increase disaster risk in a wide 
variety of ways. For example, density may correlate with higher 
percentages of impervious surfaces,47 which can elevate flood risk by 
increasing both the amount and velocity of surface runoff.48 
Increased impervious surface area in cities may also contribute to the 
“heat island effect,”49 which can exacerbate heat waves, among the 
                                                                                                           
complicated than has sometimes been assumed. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. In 
this Article, I focus on some of the unique challenges caused by increasing density in existing 
urban environments. 
 46. See Michael MacRae, Tsunami Forces Debate Over Vertical Evacuation, AM. SOC’Y 
OF MECH. ENG’RS (Apr. 2011), http://www.asme.org/kb/news---articles/articles/ 
manufacturing---processing/tsunami-forces-debate-over-vertical-evacuation (discussing the 
possibility of “vertical evacuation” to the higher floors of multistory buildings during 
tsunamis).  
 47. See Elizabeth Brabec et al., Impervious Surfaces and Water Quality: A Review of 
Current Literature and Its Implications for Watershed Planning, 16 J. PLAN. LIT. 499, 499 
(2002) (“Increasing urbanization has resulted in increased amounts of impervious surfaces—
roads, parking lots, roof tops, and so on—and a decrease in the amount of forest lands, 
wetlands, and other forms of open space that absorb and clean stormwater in the natural 
system.”). The increased flood risk associated with density may be localized to the 
development site, and these site-specific watershed effects can be minimized by a variety of 
techniques promoted by Smart Growth (such as creating or preserving greenways). However, 
many Smart Growth developments fail to take advantage of these opportunities to mitigate 
flood risk. See Song et al., supra note 13, at 17–18. On the flip side, sprawl can also increase 
flood risks. Larger lot sizes (associated with sprawl) may “decreas[e] imperviousness at a site-
specific level” but increase “imperviousness per capita . . . largely due to the additional roadway 
lengths necessary to assess the larger lots.” Brabec et at., supra, at 503.  
 48. See U.N., supra note 6, at 72 (discussing how increasing impermeable surfaces can 
increase the quantity and speed of runoff). 
 49. Fei Yuan & Marvin E. Bauer, Comparison of Impervious Surface Area and 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index as Indicators of Surface Urban Heat Island Effects in 
Landsat Imagery, 106 REMOTE SENSING ENV’T 375, 378, 385 (2007) (noting that “[t]he 
amount of impervious surfaces is related to population growth and urbanization” and that data 
“suggests that impervious surface area accounts for most of the variation in land surface 
temperature dynamics”). 
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deadliest of natural disasters.50 Moreover, residents of dense urban 
areas often face long evacuation times, which can put them at 
increased risk of death in many different kinds of disasters, including 
fires, floods, nuclear disasters, and terrorist incidents.51 Long 
evacuation times also mean that evacuations have to be ordered 
earlier for densely populated urban areas to allow sufficient time for 
the evacuation to occur. Earlier evacuations are more costly (because 
they generate more employment and business disruptions) and are 
also more likely to be unnecessary because they must be ordered 
when, for example, the path that a hurricane will take is not yet 
clear.52 There are also good reasons to think that pandemics may be 
                                                
 50. See Kevin A. Borden & Susan L. Cutter, Spatial Patterns of Natural Hazards 
Mortality in the United States, 7 INT’L J. HEALTH GEOGRAPHICS 64 (2008). Dense urban 
areas can, of course, employ techniques to mitigate the urban heat island effect, such as 
rooftop gardens and urban parks (and dense development might leave more land available for 
the latter). Additionally, one study has found that from 1956 until 2005, “the most sprawling 
cities” in the United States “experienced a rate of increase in [extreme heat events] that was 
more than double that of the most compact cities.” Brian Stone et al., Urban Form and 
Extreme Heat Events: Are Sprawling Cities More Vulnerable to Climate Change Than Compact 
Cities?, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1425, 1426 (2010). The authors conclude that “urban 
sprawl contributes to [extreme heat event] frequency” perhaps because “sprawling patterns of 
urban development” increase deforestation, which in turn may increase the urban heat island 
effect. Id. at 1427. However, the study considers only the rate of change in extreme heat 
events and does not consider whether the rate of change might be lower in compact urban 
areas because those areas already had higher absolute numbers of extreme heat events in 1956, 
the first study year. Moreover, the study’s unit of analysis is the “metropolitan region,” which 
may overlook variability within the metropolitan area. The urban heat island can be a very local 
phenomenon. See Kevin E. Trenberth et al., Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate 
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 235, 243–45 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch3s3-2-2-2.html (observing that 
“[u]rban heat island effects are often very localized”). Thus, in a “compact” metropolitan 
region, there might be far fewer extreme heat events in outer areas of the region (because 
vegetative cover has not been depleted) and more extreme heat events in the city’s densest, 
most urbanized areas. The relationship between density and the urban heat island effect is one 
that deserves further study.  
 51. A recent NPR report suggested, for example, that the January 2011 flooding in 
Brisbane, one of Australia’s largest cities, might have been more “chaotic and deadly” if 
Brisbane’s two million residents had been more “densely concentrated.” Anthony Kuhn, 
Australian City Empties as Floodwaters Crest (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 12, 2011), 
http://tinyurl.com/6prdfkm. 
 52. See William R. Travis, A Future of Mass Evacuations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2011), 
http://tinyurl.com/6sbmmsb (“More troubling is that growing coastal populations mean 
evacuations must be ordered further in advance of the storm, while the iron-clad law of 
forecasting, that reliability decreases with lead time, means that more evacuations will be 
ordered with even less certainty of a storm.”). 
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more lethal in dense, urban areas than in areas where people do not 
live in similar proximity. Studies of the 1918 influenza pandemic, for 
example, suggest a positive correlation between population density 
and epidemic mortality.53  
Additionally, the cascading failure of interdependent critical 
infrastructure systems—such as water, electricity, and health care—
during disasters can pose unique risks in dense urban areas, 
particularly because the massive scale of these systems makes quick 
repair difficult.54 Urban dwellers are also likely to be most at the 
mercy of our increasingly “just-in-time” economy because they often 
lack space to store extra food and water and lack quick access to 
backup emergency supplies.55 Thus, disaster-induced supply chain 
disruptions may create immediate and serious shortages in urban 
areas. 
Increasing density concentrates not just population but also 
resources—including the resources needed for effective disaster 
response. This concentration of response resources can be 
advantageous if those resources emerge from the disaster unscathed. 
If, however, they are destroyed in the disaster event, the resulting 
equipment shortages and communication failures can seriously 
hamper response and relief activities.56 
Channeling growth into existing cities also exacerbates disaster 
risks, above and beyond the general concerns of density, because 
many existing urban centers are located in relatively risky locations. 
Many of our biggest and oldest cities are built in areas with high 
exposure to natural hazards. “Throughout history, people have 
settled in places where Mother Nature is both friend and foe.”57 
Consequently, existing cities are often “hotspots of disaster risk.”58 
                                                
 53. See Thomas A. Garrett, Pandemic Economics: The 1918 Influenza and Its Modern-
Day Implications, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Mar./Apr. 2008, at 80–82. 
 54. See STANLEY E. MANAHAN, ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMISTRY 745 (8th ed. 2005) 
(explaining how the “complexity of urban infrastructure” increases the likelihood of cascading 
infrastructure failures). 
 55. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 24 (2d ed. 2010). 
 56. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: 
LESSONS LEARNED 37 (2006) (recounting the difficulties in Katrina response created by the 
loss of the Orleans Parish Emergency Operations Center, “extensive damage” to the “facilities 
and equipment” of “[m]any State and local public safety agencies,” and the “complete 
devastation of the communications infrastructure”). 
 57. See, e.g., FARBER ET AL., supra note 55, at 23. 
 58. Mark Pelling, Urbanization and Disaster Risk, POPULATION–ENV’T RES. 
NETWORK, http://tinyurl.com/6ssg2zu (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
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This is hardly surprising as “disaster risk is often coupled with natural 
advantages” and because many hazardous locations also boast 
incredible natural beauty, recreational opportunities, and other 
amenities.59 The settlement of America reflects this general 
settlement pattern: 
As early Americans moved inland and westward from initial 
settlements on the eastern seaboard, they were attracted to the 
banks of America’s great rivers—the commercial lifeblood of the 
nation—which promised fertile soil and easy access to resources and 
distant markets. Others settled elsewhere on the shores of the great 
oceans, establishing ports that would service both national and 
international markets, and fisheries to exploit the ocean’s 
abundance. And many later pioneers would make their homes in 
the shadow and shelter of the majestic mountains of the West. Of 
course, the very natural advantages that attracted these settlers also 
pose great risks: rivers might overflow their banks, low-lying port 
cities are vulnerable to hurricanes and other storm damage, and the 
violent geological forces that created the majestic mountains might 
shake the earth again.60 
While these settlement patterns made perfect sense, the result is 
that many of the most populous cities in the United States face 
alarming disaster risks.61 Some of the cities with the highest natural 
disaster exposure include Miami, New Orleans, Oakland, San 
Francisco, Honolulu, San Jose, Houston, Los Angeles, and Long 
Beach.62 While coastal cities are often at the greatest risk,63 many 
interior cities—including Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Sacramento, and 
Memphis—also face serious hazard risks.64  
The precarious location of so many of our existing cities suggests 
that efforts to promote their redevelopment without careful 
attention to natural hazard exposure may intensify and exacerbate 
                                                
 59. FARBER ET AL., supra note 55, at 23. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Kevin A. Borden et al., Vulnerability of U.S. Cities to Environmental Hazards, J. 
HOMELAND SEC. & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1, 1 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/ 
jhsem/vol4/iss2/5 (discussing the pattern of urban vulnerability to natural hazards in the 
United States and globally). 
 62. See Natural Disaster Risk—2008 US Cities Sustainability Ranking, 
SUSTAINLANE.COM, http://tinyurl.com/4wrvvc (last visited Nov. 28, 2011). 
 63. See Borden et al., supra note 61, at 11 (finding high hazard exposure “concentrated 
along the nation’s hurricane coasts (Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico)”). 
 64. See id. 
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disaster risk. Unfortunately, most sustainability initiatives and the 
legal tools that implement them fail to sufficiently consider the 
increased disaster exposure they may cause. Much of the relevant 
academic literature on sustainability likewise fails to recognize the 
potential disaster risk of proposals to channel growth into existing 
cities.65 Moreover, as Part IV demonstrates, some of the legal tools 
used to implement sustainability initiatives’ preference for existing 
urban areas have channeled growth, not only to cities with significant 
disaster exposure, but to the areas within those cities that are most at 
risk from natural hazards.  
A striking example of Smart-Growth-driven efforts to channel 
growth into existing urban areas with severe hazard exposure is the 
Eastward Ho! initiative in South Florida. The Eastward Ho! initiative 
had its roots in a report promulgated in 1995 by the Florida 
Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida.66 The 
Commission’s charge was to determine how the endangered 
Everglades ecosystem could be protected while ensuring a growing 
and sustainable economy in South Florida.67 The Commission 
concluded that halting westward sprawl toward the Everglades could 
best be achieved by channeling most of the region’s future growth 
into existing urban areas in the so-called Eastern Ho! Corridor,68 
which stretches along Florida’s eastern coast from St. Lucie County 
in the north to Miami-Dade County in the south.69 
 
                                                
 65. See, e.g., CALTHORPE, supra note 39, at 17 (discussing the ways that green urbanism 
can shrink carbon footprint and help mitigate climate change without once mentioning the 
current disaster risks facing existing urban areas, much less considering the ways in which 
climate change is likely to exacerbate those risks); see also FREILICH ET AL., supra note 40, at 
29–36 (no consideration of disaster risks faced by urban areas). 
 66. S. FLA. REG’L PLANNING COUNCIL, EASTWARD HO! REVITALIZING SOUTHEAST 
FLORIDA’S URBAN CORE 1 (1999) [hereinafter EASTWARD HO! REVITALIZING]. 
 67. See id. Ensuring the health of the Everglades ecosystem was viewed as important, 
not only in its own right, but also to protect the recharge of underground aquifers that supply 
water to Southern Florida. See id. at 6. 
 68. Id. at 4. 
 69. See ROBERT W. BURCHELL ET AL., EASTWARD HO! DEVELOPMENT FUTURES: 
PATHS TO MORE EFFICIENT GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST FLORIDA 4 (1999) (“After the original 
designation by the South Florida Regional Planning Council, the Eastward Ho! area was 
expanded southward to Florida City in Miami-Dade County and northward to include the 
balance of Palm Beach, Martin, and St. Lucie counties, approximating the area between Route 
1 and I-95/Florida Turnpike.”). The corridor encompasses “primarily developed lands 
bounded by I-95/Florida Turnpike and Route 1 from St. Lucie County to Miami-Dade 
County.” Id. 
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The obvious problem with redirecting South Florida’s growth 
toward the east is that the region’s eastern areas are primarily low-
lying and coastal. Indeed, Florida’s southeast coast is notoriously 
vulnerable to hurricane damage and flooding. As one recent report 
assessing South Florida’s future explained: 
South Florida is particularly susceptible to hurricane impacts. It is a 
low-lying region where, as of 2000, more than one million people 
lived in flood-prone areas and nearly 900,000 lived in Category 1 
hurricane surge zones. Miami-Fort Lauderdale was ranked the 
worst place in the nation for an extreme hurricane to strike, with 
the potential for $61.3 billion in insurance losses. Experts estimate 
that “if no other changes are made, and growth continues, a South 
Florida hurricane in 2020 might wreak physical damages and 
economic losses totaling $500 billion.”70 
There is, nevertheless, some debate about exactly how vulnerable 
the Eastward Ho! Corridor is to hurricanes and floods. One of the 
initial reports exploring and supporting Eastward Ho! claimed that, 
while some of the Corridor is particularly susceptible to hurricane 
flooding, “[t]he vast majority of the [Corridor] area is free from the 
worst hazards of storm surges characteristic of the coastal high 
hazard areas of Southeast Florida”71 because the Corridor “includes 
the coastal ridge,” which is “an inland strip of relatively high ground 
running parallel to the coast” that serves as a “natural defense against 
a storm surge.”72  
Other assessments of the Corridor’s hurricane and flooding risk 
have been far less sanguine about the Corridor’s hazard exposure. 
For example, a report prepared for the state by two local universities 
identified high flood insurance rates in the Eastward Ho! Corridor as 
a significant financial impediment to redevelopment efforts in the 
Corridor: “[P]eople in the East are paying the higher rates, not 
residents in the suburbs. The reason insurance rates affect 
investments in the corridor in comparison to the suburbs is that 
                                                
 70. CTR. FOR URBAN AND ENVTL. SOLUTIONS, FLA. ATL. UNIV., CHARTING THE 
COURSE: WHERE IS SOUTH FLORIDA HEADING? 36 (2006) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 71. EASTWARD HO! REVITALIZING, supra note 66, at 8. 
 72. Id. at 7; see also id. at 8 (“The coastal ridge effectively blocks the inland movement 
of hurricane storm surges in Palm Beach County.”). The report did acknowledge that the 
Corridor includes two areas “particularly susceptible to the effects of flooding from hurricanes: 
Central Broward County, east of I-95, which acts as the floodplain for the Middle and New 
Rivers, and Southern Dade County, south of Kendall Drive, where the coastal ridge loses its 
elevation and eventually terminates.” Id. 
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much of the corridor lies within the ‘high risk’ area east of I-95.”73 
High flood insurance rates should be viewed not simply as a 
“financial impediment” to redevelopment efforts, but as a red flag 
that redevelopment of the area in question may concentrate both 
people and resources in areas with high hazard exposure.  
Nonetheless, the Eastward Ho! initiative’s preference for 
channeling South Florida’s future growth into existing urban areas in 
the east has been codified in many regional and local planning 
documents. For example, Palm Beach County’s Comprehensive 
Plan, which was amended in 1996 and then again in 1997 in 
response to the 1995 report of the Florida Governor’s Commission, 
incorporates an explicit directive to “[r]edirect growth to the East 
where services and facilities can be provided and [to] encourage the 
revitalization/redevelopment of the coastal communities.”74  
                                                
 73. FLA. ATL. UNIV./FLA. INT’L UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR ENVTL. AND URBAN 
PROBLEMS, EASTWARD HO! FINANCIAL IMPEDIMENTS AND SOLUTIONS TO REDEVELOPMENT 
46 (Jan. 15, 1998), available at http://docs.cdsi.fau.edu/cues/fin_imp.pdf. 
 74. PALM BEACH CNTY., FLA., PALM BEACH COUNTY 1989 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN: 
ORDINANCE 2010-17 1-IA (2010), available at www.pbcgov.com/pzb/planning/ 
comprehensiveplan/introduction.pdf. This directive is implemented throughout the more 
specific elements of the plan. For example, the County’s Future Land Use Element provides 
for “bonus densities,” beyond those typically allowed, in most existing urban and suburban 
areas. See PALM BEACH CNTY., FLA., FUTURE LAND USE ELEMENT, PALM BEACH COUNTY 
1989 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN: ORDINANCE 2010-17 60 (2011), available at 
http://www.pbcgov.com/pzb/planning/comprehensiveplan/2011/FLUE_11_1.pdf. The 
allowable bonuses are higher in the eastern “urban/suburban tier” than in the western areas 
“[i]n order to encourage eastward development and a tapering off of density towards the 
western edge of the Urban/Suburban Tier.” Id. The Land Use Element does state elsewhere 
that “future land designations, and corresponding density and intensity assignments, shall not 
exceed the natural or manmade constraints of an area,” taking into account, inter alia, “flood 
plains,” id. at 44; however, that admonition is immediately followed by an equally strong 
assertion that “[a]ssignments shall not be made that underutilize the existing or planned 
capacities of urban services,” id., a command that may well lead to floodplain constraints being 
discounted in existing urban areas, particularly those targeted for redevelopment. Other plan 
elements attempt to limit both increased densities and public investment in certain high hazard 
areas, designated “coastal high-hazard areas.” See, e.g., PALM BEACH CNTY., FLA., COASTAL 
MANAGEMENT ELEMENT, PALM BEACH COUNTY 1989 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN: ORDINANCE 
2010-49 12 (2010) [hereinafter COASTAL MANAGEMENT ELEMENT], available at 
http://www.pbcgov.com/pzb/planning/comprehensiveplan/coastal.pdf (“Palm Beach 
County shall not subsidize new or expanded development in the coastal area.”); id. at 13 
(“Palm Beach County shall direct population concentrations away from known or predicted 
coastal high-hazard areas, and shall not approve increases in population densities in the coastal 
high hazard area.”); see also FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(g)(6) (2011) (requiring that local 
coastal management plan elements “[l]imit public expenditures that subsidize development in 
coastal high-hazard areas.”); id. § 163.3178(2)(h) (defining the “coastal high-hazard area” as 
“the area below the elevation of the category 1 storm surge line as established by a Sea, Lake, 
and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computerized storm surge model”). While 
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Communities outside the designated Eastward Ho! Corridor, 
including those along Florida’s Treasure Coast, have also adopted 
the initiative’s focus on redirecting growth into existing urban areas 
along Florida’s eastern coast.75 The result has been “concerted public 
reinvestment in older coastal areas, despite their vulnerability to 
coastal storms.”76 As one researcher has noted: 
Today, five of the Community Redevelopment Districts on the 
Treasure Coast are partially or entirely located in areas that fall 
within the Coastal High Hazard Area. Incentives provided by the 
Community Development Authority (CRA) [sic] to invest in the 
redevelopment of coastal urban areas run counter to the intent of 
hazard mitigation principles aimed at limiting coastal asset 
accumulation.77 
In order to ensure that future growth is concentrated in South 
Florida’s eastern regions, rather than its western suburbs, local 
governments have employed a number of legal tools, including the 
redevelopment districts mentioned above and urban growth 
boundaries. Miami-Dade, for example, has an urban growth 
boundary—called an urban development boundary—designed to 
promote growth in existing urban areas while preventing new 
suburban development in the west.78 Part IV next examines how 
                                                                                                           
these restrictions may in theory help to limit growth in the most hazardous areas, some 
redevelopment efforts may be subject to less stringent restrictions. See, e.g., COASTAL 
MANAGEMENT ELEMENT, supra, at 13 (“Infill or redevelopment densities and intensities in 
coastal high hazard areas shall be consistent with existing adjacent development but at densities 
and intensities no greater than the adopted future land use designations.”). 
 75. See, e.g., JAMES F. MURLEY ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF REDEFINING FLORIDA’S 
COASTAL HIGH HAZARD AREA 12–13 (Jan. 2008), available at 
docs.cdsi.fau.edu/cues/CHHAFINALREPORT-MAY212008.pdf (“While the Eastward Ho! 
initiative was not directed at the Treasure Coast, the principles of compact and higher density 
development have been adopted by the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council in an effort 
to efficiently accommodate the housing and accompanying commercial development needed 
for the projected population growth in the region.”); see also id. at 12 (“County and municipal 
planners throughout much of the Treasure Coast have sought to balance development demand 
with agricultural and open space conservation by steering development eastward and focusing 
on revitalizing the region’s historic cities and towns.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. EPA, GROWING FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: MIAMI-DADE COUNTY URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT BOUNDARY ASSESSMENT 3 (2010) (“The UDB is used primarily to keep 
development from spilling toward highly sensitive lands like Everglades National Park.”). 
Florida has recently enacted major changes to its growth management laws, which now allow 
for longer range planning and devolve most authority over growth management to local 
governments. H.B. 7207, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011). It will thus be up to local 
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these legal tools used to implement Smart Growth’s preference for 
channeling growth into existing cities have incentivized 
redevelopment of particularly hazardous urban lands in other parts of 
the country.  
IV. LEGAL TOOLS IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABILITY’S URBAN 
PREFERENCE 
As the prior discussion of Southeast Florida demonstrates, there 
are a variety of ways in which the preference for channeling growth 
into existing urban areas is being translated into law. Two common 
approaches include designation of redevelopment districts and 
growth management techniques such as urban growth boundaries. 
Both of these approaches are driving redevelopment of vulnerable 
cities—and, often, driving redevelopment of the most vulnerable 
areas within these at-risk cities. Additionally, California has recently 
adopted a complex new method for directing growth in that state, 
one that also has the potential to channel development into dense 
urban areas without giving adequate attention to hazard risk.79  
A. Redevelopment Districts 
One popular technique for channeling growth back into existing 
cities is the designation of redevelopment districts that promise 
revitalization and infill of underutilized urban land. These 
redevelopment districts often enjoy tax breaks (such as enterprise 
zone tax credits), an influx of federal and state spending, special 
funding techniques (such as tax increment financing),80 the use of 
eminent domain to assemble buildable parcels, and sometimes fast-
track approval processes to incentivize infill and redevelopment.81 
One of the most striking characteristics of redevelopment 
districts is their tendency to cluster around any waterfront located 
within a city.82 This pattern may exist for a number of reasons. First, 
                                                                                                           
governments to decide which growth management measures to keep in place. See id. 
 79. See Part IV.C., infra (discussing California’s new growth management approach 
under SB 375). 
 80. See supra note 20 (explaining tax increment financing). 
 81. See, e.g., CAL. REDEV. AGENCY, THE COMMUNITY GUIDE TO REDEVELOPMENT: 
CREATING SAFE, PROSPEROUS AND HEALTHY COMMUNITIES 16 (2002) (describing the tools 
available to California Redevelopment Authorities to promote redevelopment districts). 
 82. See BETSY OTTO ET AL., ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN: RESTORING RIVERS, 
CONNECTING COMMUNITIES 6 (2004) [hereinafter ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN] 
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the economic and spatial evolution of many waterfront cities has left 
waterfront areas behind, making them obvious targets for 
redevelopment. In fact, these neglected waterfront areas often 
represent the only large, contiguous tracts of land available for urban 
redevelopment. When many cities were first built, waterfront areas 
were prime property because rivers and oceans were the lifeblood of 
commerce.83 Factories, warehouses, and shipping facilities all thrived 
at the water’s edge.84 Over time, as railroads displaced rivers as the 
primary mode of transporting goods, these industries abandoned 
their waterfront locations; waterfront areas fell into disuse, and “the 
city’s downtown moved away from the river.”85 Related trends also 
marginalized ports.86 When the highway construction boom began 
in earnest, these abandoned riverfronts provided the path of least 
resistance for building highways (with the cheapest land and the least 
disruption to existing uses).87 Thus, “many highways were built 
along urban riverfronts,” cutting the waterfront areas off “from the 
cities they had once spawned.”88 When forward-thinking planners 
began to worry about suburban sprawl—a concern that has become 
central to Smart Growth and other sustainability initiatives—
targeting these abandoned areas for infill and redevelopment made 
perfect sense.  
Second, the waterfront area’s industrial pedigree often left the 
land contaminated.89 While contamination is hardly an obvious 
selling-point for redevelopment, federal environmental programs 
have funded redevelopment of brownfields,90 defined as property 
whose use or redevelopment “may be complicated by the presence or 
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
                                                                                                           
(describing an accelerating trend of urban waterfront redevelopment). The City of Sacramento, 
for example, has three redevelopment areas, all of which are located along rivers. See 
Sacramento Economic Development, Redevelopment Areas, CITY OF SACRAMENTO, http:// 
www.cityofsacramento.org/econdev/opportunity-areas/redevelopment-areas.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2011). As discussed in Part IV.B, Portland has eleven redevelopment districts, all but 
three of which are riverfront. See infra note 162. 
 83. See ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN, supra note 82, at 2. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2–3. 
 87. Id. at 3. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See EPA, BROWNFIELDS AND LAND REVITALIZATION: GRANTS AND FUNDING 
(2011), http://epa.gov/brownfields/grant_info/index.htm. 
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contaminant.”91 Some waterfront areas are receiving brownfield 
money for redevelopment,92 and sustainability initiatives in many 
cities are backing these revitalization efforts to restore the health of 
rivers by cleaning up toxins in riverfront land that may leach into the 
water.93  
Third, waterfront redevelopment holds forth the promise of 
creating a unique draw that will bring people back to the city and 
create a sense of community place and history.94 On this view, 
waterfront redevelopment is valuable not only in its own right, but 
also as a catalyst for renewing the entire urban landscape. Indeed, 
many Smart Growth advocates herald waterfront redevelopment as 
the centerpiece of a city’s urban renewal plans.95 As one prominent 
sustainability expert explained, waterfront revitalization is “an 
opportunity to give buildings the advantage of waterfront views and 
access, and bring the public back to the water’s edge.”96 Among the 
many cities that are pursuing this strategy of making the waterfront a 
cornerstone of downtown redevelopment efforts are Sacramento,  
 
 
 
 
                                                
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2004). 
 92. Andrew O. Guglielmi, Comment, Recreating the Western City in a Post-
Industrialized World: European Brownfield Policy and an American Comparison, 53 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1273, 1306 (2005) (“Another similarity between successful urban brownfield projects, 
both in the U.S. and in Europe, is that they seemed to be tied to waterfront areas.”). 
 93. See, e.g., RIVER RENAISSANCE DIRECTORS, CITY OF PORTLAND, RIVER 
RENAISSANCE STRATEGY 3-3 (2004), available at http://tinyurl.com/7om7lo7 
(“Redevelopment offers the best opportunities to realize incremental benefits to watershed 
health” by “reduc[ing] the amount of urban pollutants that run off into our streams and 
rivers.”). 
 94. See Guglielmi, supra note 92, at 1308 (“In addition to the aesthetic and 
psychological benefits, brownfield projects focused around waterways can bring restaurants, 
shops, and tourist attractions to raise a city's economic health.”). 
 95. SMART GROWTH NETWORK, GETTING TO SMART GROWTH II: 100 MORE POLICIES 
FOR IMPLEMENTATION 47 (2005), available at http://www.smartgrowth.org/pdf/ 
gettosg2.pdf. 
 96. See JONATHAN BARNETT, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: IMPROVING THE NEW 
CITY, RESTORING THE OLD CITY, RESHAPING THE REGION 154 (1996); see also Trinity 
Uptown Plan, TRINITY RIVER VISION AUTH., http://www.trinityrivervision.org/fwgc/ 
trinityuptownplan.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (promoting Fort Worth’s riverfront vision 
based on Smart Growth principles and asserting that the planned waterfront redevelopment 
will “provide a cost-efficient and viable alternative to annexation and urban sprawl”). 
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California;97 Norfolk, Virginia;98 Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas;99 
Portland, Oregon;100 and many cities in New York.101  
Unfortunately, plans to revitalize waterfront areas often are 
conceptualized with little attention to disaster risk. One recent 
example comes from Augusta, Georgia, where officials heralded the 
city’s plans to make waterfront revitalization along the Savannah 
River the foundation of its future growth.102 Augusta’s mayor 
proclaimed that “[r]iverfront development is key to the future of the 
city. We need to bring in projects that will develop a critical mass of 
people along the riverfront.”103 The mayor also noted that the 
“riverfront is a very underutilized asset for the city of Augusta. We 
still have large tracts that aren’t producing [tax] revenue for the 
city.”104 Less than a week later, however, the Army Corps of 
Engineers declared Augusta’s levees along the Savannah River—the 
levees that protect Augusta from serious flooding risk—
unacceptable.105 
As this example suggests, too many cities seem to be pursuing 
waterfront redevelopment plans—with all their available incentives 
and public money—without adequate attention to the hazards of 
reconcentrating population and property in flood zones. In 
                                                
 97. See The River District Redevelopment Area, THE RIVER DIST., 
http://www.riverdistrict.net/about-us/river-district-redevelopment.shtml (last visited Oct. 
18, 2011) (“Riverfront development is a key strategy for both establishing a sense of place for 
the district, and creating a recreation asset for the entire Sacramento region.”). 
 98. See BARNETT, supra note 96, at 133–34 (“Norfolk, Virginia, is an example of a 
community that has almost completely remade its downtown in order to remain a regional 
center. . . . It has rebuilt its waterfront to attract convention visitors and tourists, creating a 
festival marketplace, two convention hotels and a convention center, a nautical museum, and a 
new downtown baseball stadium.”). 
 99. Trinity Uptown, CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEX., http://www.fortworthgov.org/ 
PlanningandDevelopment/info/default.aspx?id=12426 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (describing 
planned revitalization of Fort Worth’s riverfront). 
 100. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 101. See Cities by the Coast, CUNY INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE CITIES, 
http://www.cunysustainablecities.org/what-we-do/cities-by-the-coast.html (last visited Oct. 
24, 2011). 
 102. Erin Zureick, City Hopes to Expand Near River, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 23, 2011, 
at B1, available at http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2011-01-22/augusta-hopes-
expand-near-river. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Brett Buffington, Report Says Augusta’s Levee “Unacceptable,” ABC 6 WJBF-TV 
(Jan. 29, 2011), http://www2.wjbf.com/news/2011/jan/29/5/report-says-augustas-levee-
unacceptable-ar-1398337/. 
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particular, communities are rebuilding in the shadow of levees 
without giving appropriate weight to residual flooding risks that exist 
if those structural flood control mechanisms fail or their design 
capacity is exceeded. 
Examination of a prime waterfront redevelopment district in 
Sacramento, California sheds further light on this phenomenon. 
Sacramento’s River District, one of three redevelopment areas 
managed by the City of Sacramento,106 is located less than a mile 
from downtown Sacramento “at the confluence of two major 
California waterways: the Sacramento and American rivers.”107 
Sacramento’s redevelopment plan for the River District will 
“transform[]” the 1,050 acre district “from its current, mostly 
industrial, businesses into an eclectic, mixed-use community 
bordered by a ribbon of parks at the rivers’ edge” that “will feature a 
wide range of employment, entertainment and housing options for 
families and individuals.”108  
Specifically, redevelopment plans feature “a 65-acre mixed-use 
development” called Township 9, funded in part by $20 million in 
California state infrastructure grants, that will include “2,300 
housing units (apartments, condos, townhomes, and live/work 
units); 150,000 square feet of neighborhood retail and restaurants; 
and over 800,000 square feet of office space.”109 Plans also include a 
new light rail station, the transformation of a historic waterfront 
street power station into the Powerhouse Science Center (housing a 
“science museum, restaurant and conference center, and a 
planetarium”), and a new headquarters for the California Highway 
Patrol.110 Enterprise Zone tax credits are available to help finance 
River District redevelopment projects.111 
Given that the River District redevelopment area is located at the 
intersection of the American and Sacramento Rivers,112 it is no 
                                                
 106. See Sacramento Economic Development, Redevelopment Areas, CITY OF 
SACRAMENTO, CAL., http://tinyurl.com/7gz9ue2 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).  
 107. See River District, CITY OF SACRAMENTO, http://www.cityofsacramento.org/ 
econdev/opportunity-areas/redevelopment-areas/river-district.cfm (last visited Oct. 24, 
2011). 
 108. Id. 
 109. CITY OF SACRAMENTO ECON. DEV. DEP’T, RIVER DISTRICT FACT SHEET (2009), 
available at http://tinyurl.com/7hr9t7x.  
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Business, RIVER DIST., http://www.riverdistrict.net/business/ (last visited Oct. 24, 
2011) (“The River District is defined by the American and Sacramento rivers on the north and 
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surprise that “[t]he majority of the [redevelopment] area is within a 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-designated 100-
year floodplain.”113 Because the California Environmental Quality 
Act (CEQA)114 requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact 
Report (EIR) for this redevelopment project, there is at least some 
documentary record of the analysis that supported targeting this 
floodplain area for redevelopment. 
The EIR explains that most of the River District redevelopment 
area is located in a FEMA “shaded Zone X” flood zone, which 
designates areas that are protected from a 100-year flood solely by 
the presence of levees and other structural flood control 
mechanisms.115 Thus, the report notes, “[t]he levees along the 
American and Sacramento Rivers provide flood protection to the 
[River District redevelopment] area,”116 as do “the upstream 
reservoirs and dams, including Folsom Dam and Shasta Dam.”117 
The EIR also acknowledges that “[t]he [redevelopment] area is 
within the dam inundation zone in the event of failure at the Folsom 
Dam,” located upstream from the project on the American River.118  
In short, all that stands between these areas and severe flooding 
in the event of a 100-year storm are the river levees and upstream 
dams (which present their own flooding risks if the dams were to fail 
due to compromised structural integrity, an earthquake, or terrorist 
attack). However, when determining the project’s impact on flood 
risk, the EIR is only charged with determining whether the project 
will result in a “significant” impact that will “substantially increase 
the exposure of people and/or property to the risk of injury and 
damage in the event of a 100-year flood.”119 
                                                                                                           
west and by the Railyards and Central City residential neighborhoods on the south and east. In 
1990, the area was designated as a Redevelopment Area pursuant to the provisions of the 
California Community Redevelopment Law.”). 
 113. CITY OF SACRAMENTO CMTY. DEV. DEP’T, RIVER DISTRICT SPECIFIC PLAN: DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT § 5.5-2 (2010) [hereinafter RIVER DISTRICT EIR]. The 
100-year floodplain, also known as a “special flood hazard area,” is that “area that will be 
inundated by the flood event having a 1-percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any 
given year.” See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FLOOD ZONES (2010), 
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/floodplain/nfipkeywords/flood_zones.shtm. 
 114. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 2100–02 (West 2011). 
 115. See RIVER DISTRICT EIR, supra note 113, § 5.5-3.  
 116. Id. § 5.5-2. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. § 5.5-9. 
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With the question so framed, the answer is easy, indeed almost 
tautological: 
Because levees currently protect the proposed RDSP [River District 
Specific Plan] area from a 100-year flood and development in 
accordance with the Specific Plan would not be allowed by law to 
compromise the integrity of the levees, implementation of the 
RDSP would not increase exposure or people and/or property to 
risk of injury and damage from a 100-year flood. This impact is 
determined to be less than significant.120 
Thus, the EIR reads as though the redevelopment will not alter 
the status quo in any meaningful way. It does not acknowledge that 
more resources and people will be concentrated in a flood hazard 
zone and will be subject to potentially catastrophic flooding in the 
event of levee failure or overtopping. The EIR’s conclusion that the 
status quo would remain unchanged stands in stark contrast to one 
commentator’s 2006 prediction that redevelopment of Sacramento’s 
River Front and construction of new, dense residential properties 
would effectively create “a whole new town on the waterfront,” 
bringing “an additional 30,000 residents” to the area.121 He noted, 
by comparison, that West Sacramento then had 35,000 residents, 
while downtown Sacramento had 39,000.122 Furthermore, he 
estimated that the redevelopment would bring an additional 80,000 
new office workers and other laborers to the riverfront area.123 
This blasé attitude toward the residual risk that exists in flood 
zones protected by levees from the 100-year storm also contrasts 
sharply with California’s own attempts to raise awareness of residual 
risks among its citizens who live in at-risk areas. California’s 2010 
Flood Risk Notice—mailed to some 300,000 California residents—
advises those living in the shadow of levees that “[e]ven if a levee is 
                                                
 120. Id. § at 5.5-14; see also id. (“As previously noted, the portion of the RDSP [River 
District Specific Plan] area that could be developed is within either the shaded X or X Zone 
designations of FEMA; therefore, this area is protected from a 100-year flood. Because the 
existing parcels proposed for development within the RDSP are protected from a 100-year 
flood and FEMA allows the types of land uses within the flood zones that are proposed by the 
RDSP; the individual developments within the RDSP area would be protected from regional 
floods.”). 
 121. Don Lipper, Watermark: If Chris Calbadon Gets His Way, West Sacramento Will 
Have Its Own Left Bank, COMSTOCK’S MAGAZINE (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://www.comstocksmag.com/Archive/1006_RF_Yolo--Watermark.aspx. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:26 PM 
2157 Smart Growth in Dumb Places 
 2181 
designed for the FEMA standard of a 1% annual chance flood, there 
is a 1-in-4 chance of a larger flood occurring within any 30-year 
period (the life of a typical home mortgage)” and that “[s]ince 1983, 
Central Valley State-Federal project levees have been breached or 
overtopped more than 50 times.”124  
Sacramento’s experience also demonstrates that cities and states 
will often face the temptation to catalyze redevelopment efforts by 
relocating public buildings and infrastructure to the redevelopment 
district. For example, one of the featured cornerstones of 
Sacramento’s River District redevelopment is a new headquarters for 
the California Highway Patrol.125 The experience of Louisiana’s 
National Guard during Katrina, however, illustrates the dangers of 
locating public resources—particularly those that are critical to 
disaster response operations—in vulnerable areas. Katrina-induced 
flooding devastated the Louisiana National Guard’s headquarters in 
the Lower Ninth Ward at Jackson Barracks, where floodwaters 
reached depths of 18 feet.126 The flooding necessitated the rescue of 
some 400 troops, first by boat to the Mississippi River Levees and 
then by Blackhawk helicopter to the Superdome,127 a shelter of last 
resort. The flooding also disabled the Guard’s joint operations 
center, which lost all power and communications during the 
storm.128 
The EPA, in partnership with the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has recently issued Smart 
Growth guidance for coastal and waterfront areas to influence how 
cities plan their waterfront redevelopment districts, as well as other 
smaller-scale infill at the water’s edge.129 Although the guidance does 
                                                
 124. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA FLOOD RISK NOTICE 2010 (2010), 
available at http://www.water.ca.gov/floodmgmt/lrafmo/fmb/fas/risknotification/links/ 
pdfs/2010_Flood_Risk_Notice.pdf. 
 125. See RIVER DISTRICT FACT SHEET, supra note 109. Portland is also building “a new 
police stable in the River District,” a riverfront redevelopment district. See BETSY OTTO ET AL., 
supra note 82, at 140. 
 126. See Tarell J. Bilbo, Louisiana Guard Rededicates Jackson Barracks, NAT’L GUARD 
(Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2010/11/110810-Louisiana.aspx. 
 127. See Paul Purpura, Life Returns to Historic Jackson Barracks, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 
31, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/10/ 
jackson_barracks_welcomes_back.html. 
 128. See John Orrell, Hurricane Katrina Response: National Guard’s “Finest Hour,” 
NAT’L GUARD (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2010/08/ 082710-
Katrina.aspx. 
 129. See EPA & NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., SMART GROWTH FOR 
COASTAL AND WATERFRONT COMMUNITIES (2010), available at 
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go some distance in warning communities against waterfront 
revitalization that may increase a community’s hazard 
vulnerability,130 the primary emphasis is on using Smart Growth 
techniques to create dense, mixed-use, walkable communities when 
developing waterfronts.131 Indeed, much of the guidance extols the 
potential advantages of waterfront redevelopment:  
[P]roperties at the water’s edge are prime redevelopment targets, 
since they are in or near the historic center of the community, are 
well connected to land- and water-based modes of transportation, 
and are close to jobs, services, and tourist sites. Waterfront 
revitalization can enhance historic, cultural, and scenic resources, 
supporting community efforts to maintain a strong sense of place 
while protecting the water and other natural resources.132 
The guidance also stresses connecting people to the water and 
guaranteeing public access to the waterfront itself.133 Sometimes the 
very planning tools the guidance identifies for increasing public 
access to waterfront areas both allow and encourage increased 
density at the water’s edge. For example, in Fernandina Beach, 
Florida, “the city established a ‘floating’ overlay district” along the 
Amelia River waterfront area “that allows property owners to double 
their density if they grant the city an easement to build a public 
boardwalk along the riverfront, allow pedestrian access, and maintain 
a view corridor.”134  
On the whole, this federal guidance emphasizes the advantages 
of Smart Growth-style waterfront development, at the expense of 
hazard risks. Indeed, some of the cities that the Smart Growth 
guidance singles out as examples of successful waterfront renewal  
 
                                                                                                           
http://coastalsmartgrowth.noaa.gov/report.html.  
 130. See id. at 31 (“[A]ll coastal and waterfront communities need to consider their 
vulnerability to natural hazards such as storms and flooding, and, for those on the coast, the 
risks from sea level rise, so that revitalizing the waterfront does not make the community more 
vulnerable to natural disasters.”); id. at 32 (“Communities facing the possibility of increased 
vulnerability from climate change-related impacts, such as increased flooding and sea level rise, 
may need to consider whether infill or redevelopment is appropriate.”). 
 131. See, e.g., id. at 4. 
 132. Id. at 31. 
 133. See id. at 18 (urging communities, as one of the Smart Growth waterfront 
development principles, to “[c]reate walkable communities with physical and visual access to 
and along the waterfront for public use”). 
 134. Id. at 19–20. 
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have experienced, or been threatened with, serious flooding many 
times in the last few years.135  
In addition to the redevelopment of potentially risky waterfront 
areas, redevelopment districts have also been created in areas subject 
to other types of disaster risk. Like waterfront redevelopment, 
redevelopment of these vulnerable areas brings people and property 
back to disaster’s edge. For example, many current redevelopment 
districts in San Francisco are located in areas that have significant 
seismic risk. 
Relative to flooding risk, seismic risk is somewhat more difficult 
to mitigate through land-use choices, because major earthquakes can 
sometimes occur along previously unknown faults.136 Nonetheless, it 
is possible to make some comparisons of the seismic risk faced by 
different neighborhoods and, in particular, to identify 
neighborhoods at serious risk for liquefaction—essentially, 
“earthquake-induced quicksand.”137 In the San Francisco region, 
many of the neighborhoods at highest risk of liquefaction are 
essentially artificially created—built on new land created when the 
bay was filled. A 2000 Seismic Report by the California Department 
of Conservation identified the neighborhoods at highest liquefaction 
risk:  
Ground failure associated with liquefaction has occurred during 
historical earthquakes in San Francisco. In the City and County of 
San Francisco the liquefaction zone is concentrated south of 
Market Street, in the Mission District, at Hunters Point, in areas of 
artificial fill (“made land”) along the waterfront, especially the 
Marina District and at Treasure Island, and along the beaches 
facing the ocean.138 
Strikingly, San Francisco has redevelopment districts (or “project 
areas”) in three of these high-risk neighborhoods.139 One of the 
                                                
 135. Compare id. at 23 (pointing to Newburyport, Massachusetts, as an example of 
successful waterfront redevelopment), with Angeljean Chiaramida, Flooding Adds to Storm 
Woes, NEWBURYPORT NEWS (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.newburyportnews.com/local/ 
x253071011/Flooding-adds-to-storm-woes (explaining recent flooding problems in 
Newburyport). 
 136. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 55, at 41. 
 137. Id. at 40 (“Liquefaction occurs when earthquake shaking of water-saturated, sandy 
soil causes that soil to liquefy and lose its strength . . . .”). 
 138. CAL. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION, SEISMIC HAZARD ZONE REPORT FOR THE CITY 
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, 2000, at vii (2001). 
 139. See Project & Survey Areas, CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO REDEVELOPMENT 
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most interesting of the redevelopment plans is for Treasure Island, 
which the 2000 Seismic report described as “consist[ing] entirely of 
sandy and silty artificial fill.”140 The Treasure Island Redevelopment 
Plan has been heralded as “the most environmentally-sustainable 
large development project in U.S. history” for its transit-oriented 
character and open space, and is “one of sixteen founding projects of 
the Clinton Climate Initiative’s Climate Positive Development 
Program.”141 The redeveloped Treasure Island will boast “8,000 new 
residential units (30% of which will be offered at below-market 
rates), three hotels, a 400-slip marina, restaurants, retail and 
entertainment venues—plus nearly 300 acres of parks and open 
space.”142 
The EIR for this project tells a somewhat less rosy story about 
the extreme engineering and construction measures that will be 
necessary to compact Treasure Island’s soil enough to mitigate some 
of the liquefaction risk.143 Perhaps the plan will be able to out-
engineer a major earthquake; however, one thing is clear: thousands 
of new residents may be staking their lives on the ability of the 
project to do just that. 
The revitalization of risky urban areas in redevelopment districts 
is being underwritten by federal money, including Community 
Development Block Grants (CDBG funds) allocated by HUD, and 
state and local tax dollars, through direct public investments and 
creative tax breaks and financing.144 The River District 
Redevelopment Area in Sacramento, for instance, received more than 
                                                                                                           
AGENCY, http://www.sfredevelopment.org/index.aspx?page=3 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) 
(listing redevelopment project areas for “Bayview Hunters Point,” “South of Market,” and 
“Hunters Point Shipyard); Treasure Island: Redevelopment, CITY & COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, http://www.sftreasureisland.org/index.aspx?page=6 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) 
(describing the Redevelopment Plan for Treasure Island). 
 140. CAL. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION, supra note 138, at 6. 
 141. Treasure Island: Redevelopment, supra note 139. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See CITY & CNTY. OF S.F. PLANNING DEP’T, TREASURE ISLAND/YERBA BUENA 
ISLAND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT II.74 (2010), 
available at http://www.sfplanning.org/index.aspx?page=1828 (describing how a more 
“stable ‘platform’” for “new buildings and roads” would have to be created by “densification 
of [Treasure Island’s] sandy soils” through “deep dynamic compaction” and “vibro-
compaction,” and how the areas would also have to be “surcharged” through “preload[ing] 
the layer of Young Bay Mud that lies beneath the 50 feet of sand” by “temporarily placing 
approximately 15 to 30 feet of soil on the area to be surcharged”). 
 144. See, e.g., Charles Bartsh, Financing Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment, 18 
GOV’T FIN. REV. 26, 28 exhibit 2 (2002). 
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a $100 million in federal and local government money.145 Because 
the disaster consequences of shifting our urban centers back into 
particularly vulnerable areas have been largely ignored, this public 
subsidization of disaster risk has not yet received the public scrutiny 
it deserves. Moreover, local governments have given inadequate 
consideration to the financial risk that a redevelopment project will 
be devastated by a natural disaster and the local government will still 
be obligated to repay the bonds that financed the project without 
the increased tax revenue that it was counting on to make the 
payments.  
B. Growth Management Laws: Urban Growth Boundaries 
Another popular technique for channeling growth into existing 
urban areas, and away from outlying suburbs or agricultural lands, is 
the adoption of urban growth boundaries146 like that employed by 
Portland, Oregon—a city which is frequently heralded by 
sustainability advocates as a model of sustainability that other cities 
should emulate.147 Urban growth boundaries aim to project the 
population (and concomitant housing and commercial development 
needs) of a region on some future date and then draw a boundary 
around the current metropolitan area in which growth to meet those 
needs must occur.148 
Urban growth boundaries—particularly those drawn quite 
strictly—privilege the current urban form and, by restricting land 
available for growth, create pressure to develop (or redevelop) the 
land inside the urban growth boundaries at higher densities.149 
Indeed, the success of a strict urban growth boundary is premised on 
the existence of opportunities to increase density within the city 
                                                
 145. River District Redevelopment Area, supra note 97.  
 146. Some states, including Oregon, Washington, and Tennessee, mandate that their 
cities designate urban growth boundaries. David Bollier, Urban Growth Boundaries, SPRAWL 
WATCH, http://www.sprawlwatch.org/ubg.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). Individual cities 
that have adopted urban growth boundaries include San Jose (and 14 other California 
communities), Boulder, Colorado, and Lexington, Kentucky. See id.  
 147. See Abby Haight, Portland Gets Its Reward: Most Sustainable City, THE 
OREGONIAN, Mar. 26, 2009 (recounting that Portland had earned SustainLane’s “top award” 
for most sustainable city every year since the organization began its rankings in 2005).  
 148. See Bollier, supra note 146. 
 149. See Eric Mortenson, Metro Says Portland Area has Room to Grow Inside Current 
Urban Boundary, THE OREGONIAN (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.oregonlive.com/ 
environment/index.ssf/2009/09/metro_says_growth_can_be_conta.html (discussing how 
much land is available in Portland for infill). 
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boundaries, primarily by increasing the availability of multifamily 
housing in existing neighborhoods and by infilling and redeveloping 
underutilized urban spaces.150  
By restricting the land available for development to that within 
the urban growth boundary, the boundary is likely to create pressure 
to develop marginal lands, vulnerable to natural disaster, that have 
escaped development because of that risk,151 as well as pressure to 
redevelop hazardous urban areas that have fallen into disuse. 
Natural hazard vulnerabilities can, of course, play a role in the 
designation of urban growth boundaries. For example, Metro, the 
elected regional government for the Portland metropolitan area, 
encourages towns to use seismic hazard maps when designating 
“urban reserve areas”—areas that will “eventually be brought inside 
the urban growth boundary.”152 Presumably, this discretion is meant 
to allow towns to ensure that areas with particularly high seismic 
risks will not be brought within the boundary as it expands. 
Moreover, in the designation of “rural reserves”—those lands 
outside the urban growth boundary that are designated for long-
term protection from urban development—counties are required to 
consider a number of factors, including whether the land is “subject 
to natural disasters or hazards, such as floodplains, steep slopes, and 
areas subject to landslides.”153 
                                                
 150. See id.; see also Urban Growth Boundary, OR. METRO (2011), 
http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=277 (explaining that one benefit of 
the urban growth boundary is incentivizing the “develop[ment] and redevelop[ment of] land 
and buildings in the urban core, helping keep core ‘downtowns’ in business”). 
 151. See generally Raymond J. Burby et al., Urban Containment Policy and Exposure to 
Natural Hazards: Is There a Connection?, 44 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 475 (2001) 
(suggesting that urban growth boundaries might increase urban exposure to natural hazards—
and thus disaster losses—by funneling development toward riskier locations within the urban 
boundary that had previously gone undeveloped because of hazard exposure). 
 152. SPANGLE ASSOCS., OR. METRO, EVALUATION OF EARTHQUAKE HAZARD MAPS FOR 
THE PORTLAND METROPOLITAN REGION OF OREGON, FINAL PROJECT REPORT 13 (1999), 
available at http://www.metro-region.org/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=15789. According to 
the report,  
Metro is encouraging towns to use the relative earthquake hazard map in 
designating urban reserve areas, which are areas that will eventually be brought 
inside the urban growth boundary. Metro also incorporated the maps into the 
Natural Hazards chapter of its Regional Framework Plan adopted by the Council in 
December 1997. 
Id.  
 153. OR. DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., DIVISION 27, URBAN AND RURAL 
RESERVES IN THE PORTLAND METROPOLITAN AREA 660-027-0060(3)(b) (2007), available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/metro_urban_and_rural_reserves.shtml. 
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The initial urban growth boundaries are, however, determined 
primarily by the extant urban form and existing growth patterns. 
When deciding where to channel growth, the disaster risk of areas 
already within current city limits (and thus presumptively within the 
urban growth boundary) is not compared to the disaster risk of areas 
that are likely to be outside the urban growth boundary. This 
approach may be particularly problematic when the boundary is 
being drawn around a city with high disaster risk. 
Portland, Oregon, is exactly such a city. Three major seismic 
faults run under the densest portions of Portland, and estimates are 
that a future earthquake along these faults might result in as many as 
7800 deaths and injuries, and over $12 billion in direct economic 
damages.154 In addition to earthquakes, the City of Portland has 
other natural hazard risks, including floods, extreme weather, and 
landslides.155 A Portland State University study of the city’s hazard 
risks found that “thirteen neighborhoods are at risk in a ‘triple 
hazard area,’ which combines the highest rates of peak ground 
acceleration [during a 100-year earthquake], 100-year flood risk and 
potential toxic release sites.”156 Most of these neighborhoods are in 
the densest regions of the city, such as the downtown area.157 
Another study found that some of the most devastating landslides 
have occurred, and are likely to occur again, in the West Hills 
neighborhood,158 which is within the metropolitan urban growth 
boundary and is experiencing rapid development. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the city’s hazard mitigation 
plan observes that a storm more serious than the 100-year flood 
“could bring floodwaters over the downtown seawall and into the 
central business district,”159 the City of Portland Bureau of Planning 
                                                
 154. YUMEI WANG & J. L. CLARK, EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE IN OREGON: PRELIMINARY 
ESTIMATES OF FUTURE EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, SPECIAL PAPER 29, at 4, 5 (1999) (summary), 
available at http://oregongeology.org/sub/earthquakes/SP29SUMMARY.pdf. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Dana Dickman et al., Spatial Analysis of Hazard Risk Factors for Vulnerable 
Populations in Portland, Oregon, BROADMOOR PREPARES (April 30, 2007), http:// 
www.broadmoorprepares.com/resources/Spatial+Analysis+of+Hazrad+Risk+Factors+for+Vuln
erable+Population+in+Portland$2C+Oregon.pdf.  
 157. Id. 
 158. SCOTT F. BURNS ET AL., LANDSLIDES GEOHAZARD MAP FOR PORTLAND, OR., USA 
5 (2006), available at http://www.iaeg.info/iaeg2006/PAPERS/IAEG_520.PDF.  
 159. CITY OF PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLAN. & SUSTAINABILITY, HUMAN HEALTH AND 
SAFETY, PORTLAND PLAN 112 (2009), available at www.portlandonline.com/ 
portlandplan/index.cfm?a=346241&c=51427I. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2188 
and Sustainability has urged reclamation of the downtown districts 
bordering the river.160 Indeed, following the pattern noted in the 
prior section,161 Portland’s redevelopment districts are clustered 
around the riverfront. Portland currently has eleven “Urban Renewal 
Areas,”162 eight of which front on either the Willamette or the 
Columbia River, or both.163 Parts of many of these districts are 
undoubtedly in the 100-year floodplain, or at least the inundation 
plain of Portland’s 1996 flood, which exceeded that of the predicted 
100-year flood.164  
In 2003, Portland’s South Waterfront Redevelopment Project 
won a prestigious Phoenix award from an environmental foundation 
for its work in reclaiming underutilized urban sites.165 The then-
Executive Director of the Portland Development Commission 
explained that redevelopment projects like South Waterfront are 
“leading the way [in] reclaiming unproductive sites in the city,” and 
that “this type of reclamation is going to be key to the city’s 
economic future” because “Portland is facing a shortage of large 
developable sites.”166  
                                                
 160. The River Plan, CITY OF PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLAN. & SUSTAINABILITY, 
http://www.portlandonline.com/bps/index.cfm?c=42540 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).  
 161.  See supra notes 81–104 and accompanying text. 
 162. Current Projects, PORTLAND DEV. COMM’N, http://www.pdc.us/currentwork/ 
default.asp (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). 
 163. Portland’s eight riverfront urban renewal areas are Airport Way, Downtown 
Waterfront, Interstate Corridor, River District, Central Eastside, North Macadam, Oregon 
Convention Center, and Willamette Industrial. See Urban Renewal Area Map (All URAs), 
PORTLAND DEV. COMM’N, http://www.pdc.us/pubs/inv_detail.asp?id=635&ty=57 (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2011) (showing the Airport Way Urban Renewal Area along the Columbia 
River; the Downtown Waterfront, River District, Central Eastside, North Macadam, Oregon 
Convention Center, and Willamette Industrial Urban Renewal Areas along the Willamette 
River; and the Interstate Corridor Urban Renewal Area, bordering both the Columbia and 
Willamette Rivers). Only the following three Portland Urban Renewal Areas are not located 
along the riverfront: Lents Towncenter, Gateway, and South Park Blocks. See id. 
 164. See id.; Hazard Map, OR. METRO, http://tinyurl.com/85j8mhy (follow “Hazard 
Map” hyperlink for map of Metro region) (last visited Dec. 3, 2011). Interestingly, despite the 
abundance of GIS data Metro makes available on its website, including the ability to overlay 
everything from the urban growth boundary to the FEMA 100-year floodplain, no map 
appears to allow overlay of urban renewal areas and either the FEMA 100-year floodplain or 
the 1996 inundation plain. 
 165. News Release: South Waterfront Redevelopment Project Wins National Phoenix 
Award, PORTLAND DEV. COMM’N, http://www.pdc.us/new/releases/2003/ 20030917.asp 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). The South Waterfront Redevelopment Area was formerly the 
North Macadam Urban Renewal Area. See ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN, supra note 82, 
at 146. 
 166. See News Release: South Waterfront Redevelopment Project Wins National Phoenix 
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The urban growth boundary may also complicate efforts to set 
aside natural preserves in areas of high disaster exposure within the 
city’s limits. Portland’s Planning Bureau has acknowledged that the 
urban growth boundary has had the “unintended consequence” of 
communicating to residents that “all nature exists outside of the 
boundary, and there’s nothing natural within.”167 This attitude has 
already been an obstacle to “preserv[ing] natural areas and creat[ing] 
new ones within Portland’s city limits.”168 It seems equally likely to 
impede any efforts to avoid development or redevelopment of areas 
with high natural hazards exposure by designating them as large 
tracts of green, open space.  
Portland’s waterfront redevelopment efforts have won acclaim 
with environmentalists, in part, because the city employs many Smart 
Growth techniques to improve river ecology and to increase access 
to, and recreation along, the rivers. Those techniques tend to create 
larger development-free buffer zones along rivers, and thus mitigate 
some flooding risk.169 However, the Smart Growth approach also 
dictates dense, transit-oriented development in these same riverfront 
urban renewal areas.170  
Beautiful waterfront promenades and trails should not disguise 
the fundamental fact that Portland’s efforts are likely increasing 
disaster vulnerability by bringing people and property back to the 
water’s edge—or at least very close to it. Nor should we lose sight of 
the fact that this shift is being subsidized, in no small measure, by 
public funding—both state and federal. Portland’s South Waterfront 
Development, for example, is being funded by “$219 million in 
public investment[] and $131 million in tax increment financing.”171 
It represents the “largest single development project in Portland 
                                                                                                           
Award, supra, note 165. 
 167. See ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN, supra note 82, at 138 (quoting Gil Kelley, 
Portland Planning Bureau). 
 168. Id. 
 169. For example, Portland’s Planning Bureau has begun implementing a new mandatory 
100-foot “greenway setback along the Willamette [River],” a significant improvement over the 
prior 25-foot setback. See id. at 140.  
 170. See, e.g., River District, Objective, PORTLAND DEV. COMM’N, 
http://www.pdc.us/ura/river.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (describing plans to transform 
the River District into a mixed-use, “high density urban residential neighborhood,” with 
housing density averaging “100 units per acre”). 
 171. ECOLOGICAL RIVERFRONT DESIGN, supra note 82, at 146. The development hopes 
to attract another $1.6 billion in private funds. See id. 
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history.”172 One can only imagine the predicament the city might 
find itself in if the redeveloped areas suffer serious flooding losses 
and the city loses the future revenue stream it is depending on to 
meet its bond obligations.173 
C. California’s New Growth Management Approach: SB 375 
California’s SB 375 is a new entry in the fight to halt suburban 
sprawl and direct growth back into existing urban areas.174 Enacted 
in October 2008, SB 375 is intended to help California meet its 
statutory goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels 
by the year 2020. To accomplish this aim, SB 375 changes the way 
regional planning agencies allocate housing needs between different 
communities to promote transit-oriented development and thereby 
reduce vehicle miles traveled.175  
While the precise effect of SB 375 is difficult to determine at this 
time, the nonprofit Partnership for Sustainable Communities 
predicts that SB 375 will likely allocate “more housing to already 
dense cities rather than to lower-density communities” because, even 
with increased density, suburbs may lack the critical mass necessary 
for successful public transportation. Thus, “[i]ncreasing the density 
of a sprawling suburb won’t necessarily reduce vehicle miles traveled 
                                                
 172. Id. 
 173. Portland’s Development Commission explains the tax-increment financing it uses 
for urban renewal as follows:  
 Urban renewal districts raise money by borrowing against future growth in property taxes. 
The city uses the borrowed money to pay for capital improvements, which spur more 
development. The city then uses the incremental increase in property taxes from the 
district to repay the loan. When the urban renewal district expires in 20–25 years, the 
intent is to return a much higher property tax base to the tax rolls. 
Frequently Asked Questions, PORTLAND DEV. CORP., http://www.pdc.us/about_pdc/faqs.asp 
(follow “What is Tax Increment Financing”) (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). If that increase in 
property taxes does not materialize, the city’s ability to repay its loan obligations will be 
jeopardized. 
 174. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65080–65086.5 (West 2009).  
 175. The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 38.500–38.599 (West 2009), requires California to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. Id. § 38.550. One of the eighteen emissions reduction 
measures adopted by the California Air Resources Board, which is charged with implementing 
the Act, is reducing vehicle miles traveled by promoting transit-oriented development. See 
California: A Primer on AB 32 and SB 375, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES., 
http://www.p4sc.org/articles/all/california-primer-ab-32-and-sb-375 (last visited Oct. 24, 
2011). 
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in the region.”176 “By contrast, increasing the number of people 
living in cities and compact suburbs where transit and amenities are 
already in place may have a bigger impact on regional emissions, 
because those people will tend to walk to stores and take transit to 
work.”177 
When allocating housing needs on a regional basis, SB 375 
directs councils of government to develop a methodology that 
incorporates a number of factors, including the opportunities for, 
and restraints on, growth in different jurisdictions.178 As part of that 
analysis, the councils are directed to consider the “availability of land 
suitable for urban development” including “opportunities for infill 
development and increased residential densities.”179 In determining 
what available land is suitable for urban development, the councils 
may—but are not required to—“exclude lands where the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of 
Water Resources has determined that the flood management 
infrastructure designed to protect that land is not adequate to avoid 
the risk of flooding.”180 
This discretionary power to exclude flood-prone land with 
inadequate “flood management infrastructure” from the calculation 
of land suitable for urban development provides only a weak 
assurance that councils will not channel growth into risky areas. The 
exclusion standard is both vague and underinclusive,181 and, in any 
event, the decision to exclude land is at the council’s discretion. 
Although only time will tell how local councils will implement SB 
375, and how they will exercise their discretion to exclude land 
subject to flood hazard from the calculus, the strong push toward 
increasing density raises the concern that, as with redevelopment 
districts and urban growth boundaries, natural hazard risk will be at 
most a secondary consideration in the growth planning process. 
                                                
 176. California: A Primer on AB 32 and SB 375, supra note 175. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65584.04(d)(2)(B). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. The standard does not take into account other hazard risks (like seismicity and 
wildfire) and also comes into play only when there is a judgment by FEMA or the state that 
the relevant levees or other structural flood protection infrastructure is lacking. Much of this 
flood protection infrastructure is inadequately monitored and evaluated.  
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V. THE WAY FORWARD 
One of the foundational and most often cited definitions of 
sustainability comes from the Bruntland Commission of the United 
Nations in 1987: “Sustainable development is development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.”182 Cities typically have 
a very long lifespan. Committing future generations to patterns of 
urban development that increase disaster risk, rather than mitigate it, 
may compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs 
just as surely as profligate consumption of finite resources or human-
induced climate change. And yet, current approaches to sustainability 
appear to be driving exactly that kind of unsustainable development, 
by channeling growth back into particularly vulnerable existing cities 
and into the riskiest parts of those cities—a result we might aptly 
describe as “Smart Growth in dumb places.”  
This failure to take adequate account of the disaster risks of 
redeveloping existing cities is not entirely surprising. There may be 
good reasons to expect that developers, city planners, local 
politicians, and the general public will systematically underestimate 
the disaster risks associated with redeveloping or increasing the 
density of existing urban areas. As Cass Sunstein has frequently 
argued, individuals faced with imperfect information about risk (and 
limited time, resources, and mental energy to devote to seeking out 
and processing further information) may form their own assessment 
of risk by relying on the perceived collective judgment of others.183 
Thus, an individual assessing the risk of building in a particular area 
where many others have already built—such as a densely populated 
urban area—may incorrectly conclude that the hazard risk is lower 
than it actually is simply because she observes that many other 
individuals have apparently concluded that it was a “safe enough” 
area in which to build.184 The flood-risk analysis in the Sacramento 
                                                
 182. U.N. G.A., Report of the World Comm’n on Environment and Development: Our 
Common Future, transmitted to the General Assembly as Annex to ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 
(Mar. 20, 1987), available at http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm. 
 183. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 721–22 (1999).  
 184. Cf. Half Truths v. Whole Truths, REDWOOD CITY SALTWORKS, 
http://www.insidesaltworks.com/?p=169 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (defending a plan to 
redevelop as residential property a salt harvesting facility on the San Francisco Bay in Redwood 
City, despite the fact that the area is an earthquake liquefaction zone, on the grounds that “the 
substrate at the Saltworks site is the same as many other areas in the Bay Area”). 
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River District EIR may exemplify this kind of thinking: the existing 
levees make current development “safe,” the expanded development 
will not damage the levees, ergo the expanded development is also 
“safe.”185 Such thinking impedes our ability to take seriously the 
disaster risks inherent in urban infill when the existing development 
that surrounds the area is subject to similar risks.  
Likewise, hazards that are viewed as familiar, commonplace, 
everyday risks are often underestimated.186 Individuals who live in 
cities vulnerable to natural disasters may adopt the attitude that every 
place is risky in some way and may view that vulnerability as just one 
of the many risks of modern life.187 
Moreover, local politicians almost always favor redevelopment 
and growth of existing cities, even in the face of substantial hazard 
risk. Growth is the bread and butter of city politics. The 
“conventional wisdom” is that a “bigger,” more populous city 
“means more jobs, more taxpayers, more revenue, better education, 
better services—in essence, a higher standard of living” for current 
city residents.188 Once a city is established, city leaders work hard to 
encourage more people to move there. And, even when a city suffers 
large population declines, it typically fights hard to reinvigorate and 
redevelop neighborhoods that are “emptying out.”189 Only a few 
American cities with declining population have affirmatively 
embraced their shrinking footprint, budget, and population.190 Even 
                                                
 185. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 186. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
37 (2005) (“A risk that is familiar, like that associated with smoking, will be seen as more 
serious than a risk that is less familiar . . . .”); see also id. at 43 (“People are far more willing to 
tolerate familiar risks than unfamiliar ones, even if they are statistically equivalent.”) (emphasis 
omitted); Rachel F. Moran, Fear Unbound: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 
1, 3 (2002) (“By contrast, other risks are so familiar that ‘social attenuation of risk’ takes place. 
Because a danger is taken for granted, the risk is systematically underestimated and insufficient 
measures are taken to prevent it.”) (summarizing Sunstein’s arguments). 
 187. See, e.g., With Earthquake Likely, Groups Promote Plans to Minimize Damage and 
Deaths, BAY VOICES, http://xpress.sfsu.edu/bayvoices/2011/01/with-earthquake-likely-
groups.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (noting that many residents of San Francisco do not 
take earthquake risk into account in deciding where to live, citing one resident who explained 
that “Mother Nature is going to have her fury, no matter where you live in the country” and 
that the amount of earthquake retrofitting a particular building had undertaken mattered less 
to his housing decision than “location and a washer and dryer”). 
 188. Timothy Aeppel, Shrink to Fit: As Its Population Declines, Youngstown Thinks 
Small—Rather Than Trying To Grow, Ohio City Plans More Open Space, WALL ST. J., May 3, 
2007, at A1. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See, e.g., Brentin Mock, Can They Save Youngstown?, NEXT AMERICAN CITY, July 
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after major natural disasters lay bare the vulnerability of a particular 
urban location, a city typically engages in a concerted effort both to 
encourage the return of displaced residents and to attract new 
residents.191 Moreover, politicians are hardly masters of delayed 
gratification, and the revenue benefits of redeveloping risky land are 
often realized in the short-term, whereas the costs of future disasters 
may not occur until long after any given politician (or city planner) 
has left the scene.192 
These factors might suggest that the problems identified in this 
Article are intractable—and they are difficult indeed. Simply 
recognizing the tension between existing sustainability approaches 
and disaster risk is, however, an important first step. We must also 
recognize that there will, inevitably, be tradeoffs. If we choose not to 
revitalize existing urban cores, more rural lands (including prime 
agricultural land) will be consumed. If we choose not to redevelop 
waterfront brownfields, those brownfields may never be cleaned up. 
Moreover, despite the importance of disaster mitigation in 
minimizing future human suffering and economic losses, disaster risk 
can only be one consideration in deciding where to channel future 
growth. If, for example, we locate new growth farther from water, 
those areas may have difficulty securing and transporting an adequate 
water supply. Other relevant factors include culture, energy 
consumption and carbon footprint, economic potential, natural 
resources, transportation networks, and other environmental 
considerations. South Florida’s predicament exemplifies these 
tensions: channeling growth to the east will likely exacerbate 
hurricane and other flooding risks; yet channeling growth to the 
west will endanger the Everglades eco-system and perhaps 
compromise the region’s water supply.193  
The question, then, is how we can best ensure that the tradeoffs 
we make are well informed and well considered. This Article surely  
 
                                                                                                           
2008, available at http://americancity.org/magazine/article/can-they-save-youngstown/ 
(explaining how Youngstown, Ohio, is “owning its population deficit” and embracing a 
“shrinking city model,” in which “the shrunk city demolishes blocks, converting its abandoned 
buildings and houses into open space for neighborhood enterprises and to nurture greenery”). 
 191. See, e.g., Alana Gomez Dong, Galveston Tries to Rebuild Population, 
CLICK2HOUSTON (June 5, 2009), http://www.click2houston.com/news/19671162/ 
detail.html (discussing Galveston, Texas’s efforts to increase population after Hurricane Ike). 
 192. See MILETI, supra note 7, at 160. 
 193. See supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text.  
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raises more questions than it can answer, but I offer some 
preliminary thoughts. 
First, we need to broaden the current conversation about 
sustainability to include discussion of disaster risk. Broadening the 
conversation will require bringing the right players to the table. At 
the federal level, the interagency Partnership for Sustainable 
Communities should be expanded to include the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). Currently, this interagency 
partnership brings together the federal agencies that exert the most 
direct and sustained influence on local land-use planning, with the 
conspicuous omission of FEMA. FEMA administers perhaps the 
most far-reaching of any federal program designed to influence local 
land-use decisions: the National Flood Insurance Program.194 It also 
administers Pre-disaster Mitigation Grants and post-disaster Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program funds195 and oversees the development 
and approval of state and local hazard mitigation plans under the 
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000,196 which are supposed to help guide 
state and local development away from natural hazards. 
The omission of FEMA from the Partnership may be a reflection, 
in part, of FEMA’s current status as a mere sub-department of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as it was demoted from 
cabinet-level status by the Homeland Security Act of 2002197 that 
created DHS.198 Whatever the cause, FEMA’s absence from the 
Partnership perpetuates a vision of sustainability in which 
consideration of natural hazards plays, at best, a secondary role. The 
failure to give a prominent role to disaster mitigation is perhaps 
confirmed by the Partnership’s six “guiding livability principles,” 
none of which mentions disaster risk.199 Including FEMA in the 
                                                
 194. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and 
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61 (1985) (describing how the National Flood Insurance Program 
impacts local land-use decisions). 
 195. See Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA), FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hma/index.shtm (outlining the hazard mitigation 
programs administered by FEMA). 
 196. Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1558–59, § 322 
(2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5165 (2006) ). 
 197. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) 
(codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 101–557 (2006)) (conditioning hazard mitigation funds on state 
development of approved natural disaster mitigation plans). 
 198. See 6 U.S.C. § 316. 
 199. The Partnership’s six livability principles are: (1) “provide more transportation 
choices,” (2) “promote equitable, affordable housing,” (3) “enhance economic 
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Partnership would ensure the presence of a strong proponent of 
disaster mitigation at the table to help generate interagency 
discussion of, and attention to, the issue. FEMA’s inclusion in the 
Partnership would also have the benefit of signaling to planners and 
grant applicants that disaster mitigation is, indeed, an important 
component of sustainability.  
At the state and local level, broadening the sustainability 
dialogue to include disaster mitigation will require bridging existing 
gaps between planners and emergency managers. Traditionally, land-
use and growth issues are the province of local land-use planners, 
while disaster mitigation is the province of emergency managers.200 
To end the stove piping of these issues, local officials will have to see 
past some of these traditional boundaries. The federal government or 
state governments could help incentivize such cross-fertilization by 
requiring integration of state and local hazard mitigation plans, 
developed under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, into local 
general plans that guide zoning decisions.201 
                                                                                                           
competitiveness,” (4) “support existing communities,” (5) “coordinate and leverage 
investment,” and (6) “value communities and neighborhoods.” Partnership For Sustainable 
Communities: EPA-HUD-DOT, supra note 29. How significant FEMA’s omission from the 
Partnership is depends, of course, on both the role and influence of the Partnership and 
whether the existing agency partners nonetheless choose to bring disaster mitigation to the 
forefront in their decisionmaking. Thus far, the most visible Partnership activities have been 
joint administration of grants. HUD awarded $100 million dollars in Sustainable Communities 
Regional Planning Grants in October, 2010. See Press Release, HUD, HUD Awards Nearly 
$100 Million in New Grants to Promote Smarter and Sustainable Planning For Jobs and 
Economic Growth (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/ 
HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2010/HUDNo.10-233. The grant 
guidelines did encourage cities to address natural hazards in their regional planning, which 
suggests that FEMA’s absence from the partnership may not mean that disaster risks are 
neglected. See Notice of Funding Availability for HUD’s Fiscal Year 2010 Sustainable 
Communities Regional Planning Grant Program, DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/grants/nofa10/scrpg.cfm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) 
(click through program section) (noting that funds will be available to support development of 
regional plans for sustainable development that, inter alia, “proactively consider[s] risks from 
disasters and climate change”). There is some value in putting the onus on HUD, DOT, and 
EPA to think about disaster risk themselves, and the agencies seem to be doing a decent job of 
considering disaster risk; however, even when agencies are trying to think holistically, they are 
likely to give the most weight to their primary existing mandates.  
 200. See Integrating Hazard Mitigation into Local Planning, AM. PLANNING ASS’N, 
http://www.planning.org/research/hazards/index.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) 
(explaining that hazard mitigation is often the “exclusive domain” of emergency managers, and 
planners typically have little interaction or input in the mitigation process). 
 201. See, e.g., Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government 
Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 
ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 184 (2006) (urging that the Disaster 
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 Because land-use decisions are typically a state and local 
prerogative and approaches to land-use planning vary from state to 
state, state legislatures may be in the best position to encourage 
intergration of hazard mitigation into land-use decisions by, for 
example, amending their state enabling acts to require consideration 
of hazard mitigation in land-use planning. Moreover, when a state or 
locality adopts sustainability policies or legislation, it should include 
disaster mitigation as an important component and goal of 
sustainability. New York, for example, should consider amending its 
recently adopted Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy Act to 
include attention to disaster risk as one of its Smart Growth 
criteria.202  
Second, in addition to bringing more players to the table and 
bridging existing gaps between those players, we need more forums 
for discussion of the role of disaster mitigation in long-term 
sustainability. Regional visioning projects provide opportunities for 
comprehensive consideration of all of the factors—including disaster 
risk—that should influence decisionmaking about where future 
growth should occur. The post-Katrina vision for Louisiana, 
Louisiana Speaks, was the first regional vision to give serious 
consideration to disaster risk.203 Regions now embarking on 
visioning projects should follow Louisiana’s example; it should not 
take another tragic disaster to motivate regions to make disaster 
mitigation an important component of visioning. Including disaster 
mitigation in regional visioning is especially critical now that 
California lawmakers have given such visioning—also called 
blueprinting—a central role in that state’s efforts to achieve 
greenhouse gas reductions, and other states may be inclined to 
follow suit.204 
                                                                                                           
Mitigation Act of 2000 be amended to require integration of mitigation plans into local 
comprehensive plans as a condition of receiving federal funding for hazard mitigation). At the 
federal level, integration is currently required only for “enhanced mitigation plans,” that 
qualify the state for additional mitigation funds. 44 C.F.R. § 201.5(b)(1) (2010). 
 202. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Louisiana Speaks, LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTH., http://lra.louisiana.gov/ 
index.cfm?md=subsite&tmp=home&ssid=1 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 204. See SB 375 Connects Land Use and AB 32 Implementation, THE PLAN. REP., 
http://www.planningreport.com/tpr/?module=displaystory&story_id=1257&format=html 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (“[SB 375] requires the 18 metropolitan planning organizations 
across the state of California to show that their future planning scenarios will result in a 
reduction in carbon. The requirement will engage regions in a process similar to a process 
pioneered [in] Sacramento, known as ‘the blueprint,’ which essentially says that we need to 
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Additionally, states might experiment with procedural 
mechanisms for consideration of disaster risk akin to the EIR 
required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)205 or 
the environmental impact statement (EIS) required for some federal 
projects by the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act.206 Such 
experiments might involve expanding existing environmental impact 
assessments to include a more explicit focus on disaster risk or 
crafting new, separate disaster impact assessment requirements. 
Currently, however, California is moving in the opposite direction, 
limiting the reach of CEQA.207 Indeed, California’s legislature 
recently amended CEQA to sharply limit EIR requirements for the 
very kind of developments most at issue in this Article: infill 
projects.208  
Third, broadening the conversation about sustainability and 
disaster risk also means expanding the options being considered 
when charting a sustainable future. The risks of redeveloping urban 
areas must, of course, be weighed against the costs and risks of 
alternative growth patterns. Sprawl, however, is not necessarily the 
only alternative strategy. States, regions, or cities might decide, for 
instance, that they should be planning for new urban cores in less 
risky locations, rather than publicly subsidizing either sprawling 
suburbs or the shifting of existing urban cores toward hazardous 
areas through strategies like waterfront redevelopment. The map of 
major cities does not always need to look exactly as it does today. 
Indeed, the creation of new cities or centers of growth may be 
inevitable, as existing urban centers are unlikely to be able to  
 
                                                                                                           
plan as a region, not just as individual cities and counties.” (quoting Calif. Sen. Darrell 
Steinberg)). 
 205.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 206.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (explaining that the EIS is designed to require agencies to 
take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of prospective projects but does not impose 
any substantive mandate on agency decisionmaking).  
 207.  See Richard Frank, CEQA “Reform” in California: 3-For-3, LEGAL PLANET: THE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 7, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/10/07/ 
ceqa-reform-in-california-3-for-3/ (summarizing recent amendments to CEQA limiting 
CEQA’s reach). 
 208.  See S. 226, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Cal. 2011) (expanding the definition of infill 
projects and limiting the scope of EIRs for qualifying projects by, inter alia, eliminating the 
need to consider significant effects addressed in prior EIRs, alternative locations, and 
“[g]rowth inducing impacts”). 
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accommodate all future growth unless we redevelop them at 
densities that are unacceptable to many citizens.  
Serious consideration should also be given to the controversial, 
indeed almost unthinkable, option that certain cities or regions 
simply should not grow at all. If South Florida, for example, cannot 
grow without either concentrating people and resources in areas with 
serious hurricane and flooding risk or threatening the region’s water 
resources by encroaching on the Everglades, then perhaps local and 
state leaders need to be asking hard questions about whether, and 
under what circumstances, growth can reasonably occur. 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that cities and states will ask these tough 
questions so long as the costs of disaster are largely externalized—by 
subsidized flood insurance and generous post-disaster relief—to the 
nation as a whole.  
This dilemma suggests that we must take a hard look at 
subsidization of the development (and redevelopment) of hazardous 
areas—whether that subsidization takes the form of the National 
Flood Insurance Program, HUD money for urban redevelopment, 
or state and local tax dollars for urban infill. It is, of course, possible 
that the economic benefits of redeveloping certain risky urban 
locations justify the periodic disaster costs that will be incurred, but 
public underwriting of the costs of both redevelopment and disasters 
skews current development decisionmaking in favor of investment in 
hazardous locations.  
Fourth, if cities do choose to redevelop particularly vulnerable 
areas despite the disaster risks, those redevelopment efforts should 
employ an urban form that either helps mitigate current risks or will 
facilitate strategic retreat in the future. For example, some experts 
have suggested that strategic retreat can be more easily accomplished 
if a waterfront community is built around a series of roads (and 
utilities) that run perpendicular to the coast, rather than being built 
around a coastal road that runs parallel to the waterfront’s edge.209 
Such an urban design allows communities to make some concessions 
to the water over time (by ceding the property and stretches of road 
closest to the water) without losing all coastal access and road and 
utility infrastructure.210 Urban redevelopment, then, can at least be 
                                                
 209. See TURBOTT & STEWART, supra note 18, at 30–31 (explaining how networks of 
roads that run perpendicular to, rather than parallel to, shorelines can facilitate a process of 
managed retreat from coastal hazards). 
 210. See id. 
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an opportunity to ease the way to more permanent mitigation 
measures that may be necessary down the road. 
Fifth, in assessing where we ought to channel growth we must 
employ a more thoughtful conception of risk than has traditionally 
been used in land-use decisions. For example, more attention needs 
to be given to the residual risk of areas protected from flooding by 
structural flood protection measures such as levees. Decision makers 
often entirely ignore this residual risk, despite the potentially 
catastrophic results of levee failure or overtopping.  
Moreover, too often the litmus test for deciding the 
appropriateness of future floodplain development is whether that 
land is located in the FEMA-designated 100-year flood plain.211 
Although the 100-year flood designation has become a de facto 
safety standard, it was never intended as such and does not represent 
any kind of reasoned judgment about what kind of risk is acceptable, 
and for what purposes.212 This standard is particularly problematic as 
the effects of climate change may mean that the 100-year storm 
becomes the 70-year storm, or even the 30-year storm.213 
Unfortunately, at least for floods and hurricanes, the historical record 
may no longer be a particularly accurate predictor of future disaster. 
As one beleaguered emergency manager dealing with flooding along 
the Red River recently complained, the 100-year storm seems to be 
coming “every year.”214 
Of course, once we move away from the 100-year floodplain 
standard, it is hard to know what should replace it. Recent legislation 
in California will soon require that urban developments be protected  
 
                                                
 211. See, e.g., supra note 120–122 and accompanying text.  
 212. See Levee System Evaluation for the National Flood Insurance Program Fact Sheet, 
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS (2010), http://www.usace.army.mil/LeveeSafety/ 
KeyDocuments/Pages/lev_keydocs.aspx#eval (“The FEMA 100-year flood is a flood 
insurance standard, not a public safety standard.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Paul Kirshen et al., Coastal Flooding in the Northeastern United States Due 
to Climate Change, 13 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 
437 (2008) (concluding that under a high greenhouse gas emissions scenario, the 100-year 
storm in the northeastern United States could become the 30-year storm by 2050; under a 
lower emissions scenario, the 100-year storm could become the 70-year storm). 
 214. In Minnesota, Melting Snow Means Major Floods, NPR (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/21/134743008/In-Minnesota-Melting-Snow-Means-Major-
Floods (quoting the mayor of Moorhead, Minnesota, located across the river from Fargo, 
North Dakota). 
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from the 200-year flood.215 However, simply picking another nice, 
round (but arbitrary) number cannot be the right answer.  
In sum, what may be required is a more holistic approach, so 
that the cumulative effects of individual, disconnected development 
decisions do not remake our cities in much more vulnerable forms. 
Such a holistic approach would allow us to step back from individual 
land-use decisions, and the policy commitments and economic 
considerations that drive them, to view the contours of the cities we 
are creating and to ask again whether there might be a better 
approach. Many cities and regions are already attempting to 
reimagine themselves, and sustainability initiatives can be an 
important component of those visions, so long as inattention to 
natural hazards does not transform those visions into nightmares. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 215. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65007(l) (West 2009) (defining “urban level of flood 
protection” as that necessary to withstand flooding that ‘‘has a 1-in-200 chance of occurring in 
any given year’’).  
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